



Corporate Governance and the Long-Run Performance of Firms 
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ABSTRACT 
Corporate governance has been propelled to the forefront of contemporary business thinking by a 
string of high profile corporate collapses and dramatic regulatory responses in the United States, 
Australia and in other countries as well. A particularly extensive body of research has emerged 
surrounding the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. We combine the 
governance literature with evidence on the long-term underperformance of firms issuing seasoned 
equity to examine the benefits of corporate governance in a setting where it is more likely to matter. 
That is, we address the question, “Does good corporate governance mitigate post-issue 
underperformance?” For a broad sample of Australian seasoned equity offerings and employing a 
comprehensive, self-constructed governance database, we first demonstrate that issuing firms 
substantially underperform a variety of benchmarks over the long term, confirming similar findings 
in the existing literature. We then find evidence that better-governed firms do not experience the 
same degree of post-issue underperformance. Our findings, which are robust to a variety of 
estimation methods and econometric specifications, are consistent with the windows of opportunity 
hypothesis and with equity raisings being an important channel through which better corporate 
governance can improve future performance. 
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In the words of Borsch-Supan and Koke (2002) “the economic analysis of corporate governance is in vogue.” 
Two years earlier that was not the case, but today this statement rings truer than ever. In 2001, a spate of high 
profile corporate collapses in the United States climaxed with the spectacular failure of Enron, an event which 
many would come to attribute directly to failed corporate governance practices. The resulting fallout 
engendered a comprehensive re-evaluation of the role and implementation of corporate governance 
mechanisms in the U.S. market, culminating in an unprecedented regulatory response in the form of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. The accompanying proliferation in the corporate governance literature sought to 
address a number of issues, none more so than the relationship between governance and firm performance.  
The collapses of OneTel and HIH in 2001 served to highlight comparable weaknesses in the governance 
structures of Australian firms, and in March 2003 the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) released a 
document entitled “Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations.” These 
principles provide a set of guidelines for sound corporate governance practices in ASX-listed firms and are 
enforced, as in other countries, on a “comply or explain” basis. According to the ASX, “good corporate 
governance structures encourage companies to create value through entrepreneurism, innovation, development 
and exploration” (ASX (2003), p3) and, since its introduction, Australian firms have made substantial 
progress towards ensuring they have better governance mechanisms in place.1 If the ASX is correct, it is 
reasonable to expect better corporate governance is associated with better performance. Despite the abundance 
of literature investigating such a relationship in the U.S. (see, for example, Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003); 
Brown and Caylor (2006)), restrictions on the availability of comprehensive and reliable data concerning the 
corporate governance attributes of Australian firms have prevented a detailed analysis of this association in 
Australia. An exception is Henry (2008), who suggests compliance with the ASX guidelines does enhance 
firm value.  
We fill this gap in by combining the governance literature with the extensive body of research documenting 
the long-term underperformance of firms conducting seasoned equity offerings in the U.S. (see Bayless and 
Jay (2008) amongst others) and Australia (Brown, Gallery and Goei (2006)). We then explore the empirical 
relationship between corporate governance and the long-term performance of seasoned issuers, to determine 
whether good quality corporate governance might mitigate the underperformance that typically follows a 
seasoned equity offering (SEO). In other words, we investigate the benefits of better corporate governance in a 
setting where underperformance can be substantial, so that any connection between corporate governance and 
performance is more likely to be found. 
Our line of reasoning is as follows. The most widely advocated explanation for the long-term 
underperformance of seasoned issuers contends that managers, acting in the interests of existing shareholders, 
attempt to time the equity market by issuing stock in transitory periods of overvaluation (see, for example, 
Loughran and Ritter (1995)), thereby taking advantage of information asymmetry. Underperformance then 
                                                 
1 See Section 4.1 and Figure 1 (below) for supporting evidence. 
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ensues as the market re-prices the firm’s stock to better reflect the fundamental value of the company. Beekes 
and Brown (2006) find that better corporate governance leads to more informative disclosures to the market 
and thus decreases the level of informational asymmetry between managers and investors. It follows that, by 
reducing the incidence of windows of opportunity whereby overvalued stock can be sold, good quality 
corporate governance may serve to moderate underperformance following an SEO.  
Our analysis is conducted in two stages. First, using a sample of 11,055 private placements, 1,828 rights issues 
and 511 share purchase plans conducted by Australian firms between 1992 and 2006, we establish that 
companies raising seasoned equity do indeed underperform over the long term. We employ a long-run event 
study, using buy-and-hold abnormal returns and calendar-time techniques, to calculate and evaluate abnormal 
returns against a variety of benchmarks over a three year post-event window. We observe a strong, statistically 
significant level of underperformance under the majority of the specifications considered, in line with existing 
literature. The underperformance is greatest for firms conducting private placements, consistent with the 
market timing, or windows of opportunity, explanation for post-issue underperformance.  
In the second stage we use a series of cross-sectional regression models to investigate the relationship between 
post-issue abnormal returns and firms’ corporate governance characteristics, controlling for other company 
and issue-specific factors as appropriate. We find a significant positive relationship between the quality of 
SEO firms’ corporate governance structures and their post-issue abnormal returns, under a number of 
specifications. As in the first stage, this effect is demonstrably the strongest for our sample of private 
placements, with results for firms conducting rights issues and share purchase plans appearing considerably 
weaker. We find this result to be robust to various estimation methods, alternative model specifications and 
additional controls.  
Our study makes five significant contributions. First, we provide the most comprehensive and in-depth 
analysis of the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance in the Australian market to 
date. We differentiate our study from prior Australian literature by developing and employing an extensive, 
detailed and versatile database of corporate governance attributes of Australian firms. Accordingly, our 
second contribution extends beyond the confines of this study and has the potential to facilitate other advances 
in the Australian governance literature in coming years. Third, in the first stage of our analysis we provide a 
thorough investigation of the long-run performance of firms issuing seasoned equity in the Australian market. 
Fourth, our study constitutes the first effort to consider the impact of corporate governance practices in the 
context of post-issue performance. Fifth, since equity raisings are not uncommon events, we identify a 
plausible channel through which better corporate governance can enhance future performance.  
The remainder of the  paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature and develops the 
two hypotheses. Section 3 outlines the first stage of analysis, which determines whether seasoned issuers 
underperform a series of return benchmarks over the long run. Section 4 contains a cross-sectional analysis of 





2 PREVIOUS LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES 
Our research question combines two major streams of the finance literature. The first concerns the evaluation 
of the long-run performance of firms issuing seasoned equity, wherein several influential studies have 
revealed systemic market underperformance of issuers over a three to five year post-issue window. The 
second comprises a substantial body of literature considering the relationship between corporate governance 
and performance.  
2.1 The Long-Term Performance of Seasoned Equity Offerings 
The U.S. literature concerning the long-run performance of issuing firms can be traced back to Friend and 
Longstreet (1967) and to Stigler (1964), who notes that over his sample period, “it was an unwise man who 
bought new issues of common stock.” (p725) Thirty years later Loughran and Ritter (1995) examine in detail 
the long-run impact of both initial and seasoned offerings, and find both are poor investments over a five year 
post-issue period. A similar approach is taken by Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995), who observe much the 
same pattern, demonstrating that companies that issued seasoned equity subsequently underperformed a 
sample of size and industry matched firms that did not.  
The most commonly advocated explanation for this phenomenon is due to Ritter (1991), who argues that 
management, acting in the interests of existing owners as in Myers and Majluf (1984), take advantage of 
windows of opportunity to issue equity when investors are overly optimistic about the value of their stock. 
Underperformance then follows as the market revises its expectations of future earnings and the firm’s stock is 
downgraded. Further support for this view is provided by Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996), who find that 
windows of opportunity for equity issuance result, at least partially, from asymmetric information. Similar 
conclusions are drawn by Jindra (2000) and Baker and Wurgler (2002); and, in a survey of U.S. corporate 
finance practitioners, Graham and Harvey (2001) reveal that up to two thirds of CFOs admit to timing the 
market when issuing equity. 
Despite a comprehensive body of literature documenting the long-term underperformance of issuing firms, 
several papers have emerged disputing the existence of such an anomaly. Fama (1998) contends that a series 
of econometric flaws relating to risk factors, factor models and sample portfolios characterise approaches used 
in earlier studies. Eckbo, Masulis and Norli (2000) find that issuer underperformance reflects lower systematic 
risk exposure for issuing firms relative to their matches, concluding that the underperformance effect is driven 
by exposure to leverage and liquidity factors commonly associated with issuance. Mitchell and Stafford 
(2000) demonstrate that the use of the calendar-time methodology as advocated by Fama (1998) causes the 
SEO anomaly to disappear, contending that the misspecification of the buy-and-hold approach used in prior 
studies is the major cause of the identification of anomalous underperformance.  
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Several of these matters are addressed by Bayless and Jay (2003), who use a broad sample of issues made 
between 1971 and 1995 to examine the long-run performance of SEO firms. They conclude that issuers 
consistently enjoy superior performance except during the five years immediately following the issues. In 
contrast to the earlier findings of Mitchell and Stafford (2000), these results are found to be robust when 
models are estimated using a calendar-time approach and the event firms are split into four portfolios based on 
the time to or from issuance, rather than being grouped into a single portfolio. Eberhart and Siddique (2002) 
demonstrate the existence of a delayed wealth transfer effect from stockholders to bondholders, consistent 
with the market timing hypothesis. Finally, Bayless and Jay (2008) employ a multiperiod calendar-time 
approach, finding that SEO firms exhibit significantly lower systematic risk and risk adjusted returns over a 
six year post-issue period compared with non-issue periods. Thus, despite some dissenting views, the general 
consensus is that an underperformance anomaly does exist in U.S. equity markets. 
The same anomaly has been found in Australia. Soucik and Allen (1999) study the long-run performance of 
137 SEOs made by Australian firms between 1984 and 1993 and report abnormal losses in each of the first 
five post-issue years. Brown, Gallery and Goei (2006) examine long-run post-SEO performance for a much 
larger sample of 3,650 rights issues and private placements in Australia. They find that issuing firms 
underperform common share market benchmarks for up to five years after the announcement, with private 
placements leading to more severe underperformance than rights issues. They also confirm the existence of a 
relationship between underperformance and market misvaluation, supporting the notion that managers of 
Australian companies attempt to time the market with respect to an SEO. In a detailed study of share purchase 
plans, Brown, Ferguson and Stone (2008) document long-term underperformance of the firms that 
implemented them.  
That the SEO underperformance effect is evident in Australia is unsurprising, considering the observation by 
Loughran and Ritter (1995) that post-issue underperformance is more pronounced for small firms. Since the 
Australian market is characterised by an abundance of relatively small firms (Brown, Gallery and Goei 
(2006)), it seems reasonable to expect a considerable level of underperformance among Australian issuers. 
This pattern is consistent with windows of opportunity being the key driver of long-term underperformance, as 
small firms are generally subject to a greater degree of informational asymmetry (Hasbrouck (1991)).  
Based on the strength of the U.S. literature and some prior Australian studies, we propose the following 
hypothesis: 
HI: Firms issuing seasoned equity through private placements, rights issues and share purchase plans will 




2.2 Corporate Governance and Firm Performance 
Corporate governance is defined by the ASX as “the framework of rules, relationships, systems and processes 
within and by which authority is exercised and controlled in corporations” (ASX (2003), p3). In recent years, 
an extensive body of empirical research has sought to determine the extent to which governance practices 
affect the ability of companies to create value and maximise shareholder wealth.  
Early research, based predominantly on U.S. markets, focused largely on the relationship between individual 
elements of firms’ corporate governance and their market performance. Evidence surrounding the impact of 
board composition is mixed and inconclusive (see, for example, Bhagat and Black (1999)), while Yermack 
(1996) reveals an inverse relationship between board size and corporate value. Other aspects of internal 
governance considered include the frequency of board meetings (Vafeas (1999)), insider equity ownership 
(McConnell and Servaes (1990)), blockholder ownership (Bethel, Liebeskind and Opler (1998)) and CEO 
duality (Brickley, Coles and Jarrell (1997)).2 A series of studies considers the influence of various individual 
external governance mechanisms (relating to the market for corporate control) on firm value, commonly by 
examining market reactions surrounding the announcement of their introduction. These studies find 
conflicting results in seeking to quantify the impact of a range of anti-takeover provisions (see, for example, 
DeAngelo and Rice (1983); Linn and McConnell (1983)). As noted below, however, the relevance of such 
external governance mechanisms in a study of the Australian market is limited.  
Following a string of corporate collapses and the 2002 introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the U.S., 
debate has intensified regarding the effectiveness and suitability of standardised corporate governance 
practices. This has seen the literature concerning the relationship between governance and firm performance 
propelled to the forefront of contemporary financial thinking, and a body of research on this issue has 
subsequently been published worldwide. Many of these more recent papers can be differentiated from the 
earlier literature by their use of composite corporate governance scoring systems to quantify and evaluate the 
overall governance quality of individual firms, taking into account a range of both internal and external 
governance factors.  
Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) (GIM), in perhaps the most influential of these studies, use a performance-
attribution regression approach to demonstrate that firms’ equity market performance is significantly and 
negatively related to an index constructed from 24 external governance policies, primarily anti-takeover 
provisions (ATPs), which are thought to reduce shareholder rights. GIM conclude by suggesting that weak 
shareholder rights caused additional agency costs in the 1990s which were initially underestimated, before the 
importance of governance was recognised and priced by the market. Similar findings emerge in a study by 
Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2004).  
                                                 
2 We follow Cremers and Nair (2005) in defining internal governance as being primarily comprised of blockholders and 
the board of directors, while external governance relates to the market for corporate control.   
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To investigate the relative impact of internal and external governance measures, Cremers and Nair (2005) 
introduce blockholder and pension fund ownership as proxies for internal governance quality into their model 
alongside GIM’s index of external measures. They conclude that internal and external mechanisms are 
complementary in their association with long-run firm performance. Brown and Caylor (2006) create their 
own corporate governance index built around 51 firm-specific internal and external governance mechanisms. 
They show their index, which considers factors such as audit, board/director characteristics, compensation and 
ownership, can provide more explanatory power for firm value than indices confined to external measures. 
Larcker, Richardson and Tuna (2007) use principal component analysis to draw 14 governance constructs 
from a set of 39 structural governance measures relating primarily to board characteristics, stock ownership, 
institutional ownership, activist stock ownership, debt-holders, executive compensation and ATPs. They find 
that these constructs have some ability to explain future operating performance and excess stock returns. Thus, 
there is considerable evidence that internal governance characteristics, as well as external factors, have a 
significant impact on firm performance in the U.S. market.  
Despite a body of literature finding a positive and significant association between governance and 
performance, several recent papers have questioned the nature of the relationship implied by the above 
studies. Lehn, Patro and Zhao (2006), Core, Guay and Rusticus (2006) and Chidambaran, Palia and Zheng 
(2008) suggest that GIM’s results can be explained better by managers of low value companies subsequently 
adopting provisions which reduce shareholder rights in order to entrench themselves, or by the omission of 
other variables which affect both firm value and corporate governance. Other studies support the view that a 
firm’s governance structure is endogenously determined, whereby factors such as managerial ownership 
(Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999)), board characteristics (Hermalin and Weisbach (2003)) and 
ownership concentration (Bushman, Chen, Engel and Smith (2004)) are products of the firm’s organisational 
and economic environments.  
Although a well established body of empirical governance literature has emerged in the U.S., few studies 
examine the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance in the Australian market. 
Nevertheless, Australia has seen a comparable community focus on governance emerge in recent years in the 
wake of the collapses of HIH and OneTel and the introduction of the ASX guidelines. As with the U.S. 
literature, earlier Australian studies focused mainly on relationships between performance and individual 
components of corporate governance, and only more recently has the impact of governance been considered 
on a more comprehensive basis.  
Earlier Australian studies reveal evidence of a positive relationship between corporate performance and 
elements of governance such as board size and independence (Kiel and Nicholson (2003)) and the existence of 
board committees (Calleja (1999)), although Craswell, Taylor and Saywell (1997) do not find any relationship 
between the performance of Australian firms and either insider or institutional ownership. In one of the few 
studies to employ a composite corporate governance scoring system, Linden and Matolcsy (2004) conduct a 
broader analysis of governance measures using the Horwath-University of Newcastle Corporate Governance 
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Report (hereafter, the Horwath Report). They conclude there is no reliable evidence that corporate governance 
is related to operating or financial performance in the Australian market. In another study utilising the same 
governance dataset, Cui, Evans and Wright (2007) find a positive relation between corporate governance 
quality and valuation for 100 of the largest ASX-listed firms in 2004, but not in 2001. Their findings suggest 
that firms adopting the ASX guidelines from 2003 sent a positive signal to the market regarding the quality of 
their management. Using a self-constructed index comprised of eight internal governance characteristics, 
Henry (2008) observes a positive, long-term relationship between the implementation of internal governance 
reform and Tobin’s Q for a sample of 116 large firms between 1992 and 2002, implying that compliance with 
the ASX recommendations could have a real valuation impact for Australian firms.   
Two main restrictions have prevented the Australian governance literature from evolving, as in the U.S., 
towards the wider application of composite scoring systems in evaluating the broader influence of corporate 
governance. First, and most importantly, the lack of comprehensive and reliable data describing corporate 
governance attributes of Australian companies prevents the construction and utilisation of the kind of 
composite corporate governance scoring system that has enabled the U.S. literature to thrive. In addition, 
while the majority of scoring systems used in U.S. studies have focused on measures of external governance, 
statutory limitations on ATPs and the relatively subdued nature of the Australian market for corporate control 
renders these external measures less relevant in the context of the governance structures of Australian firms. 
As noted by Pham, Suchard and Zein (2008), this may raise issues regarding the comparability of the 
Australian and U.S. governance literatures. Thus, Australian studies, including ours, are largely based around 
on role and influence of internal governance characteristics.  
2.3 Corporate Governance and SEOs 
Beekes and Brown (2006) use a series of indicators relating to how the market responds to information flows 
from Australian companies to show that higher quality corporate governance is associated with more 
informative disclosure, thereby reducing informational asymmetry between managers and investors.  
It is not unreasonable, therefore, to expect that, by increasing the informational efficiency of the market, 
corporate governance could go some way towards reducing the incidence of windows of opportunity, whereby 
information asymmetry leads to periods of market misvaluation and enables managers to time the market with 
regard to issuing seasoned equity. Thus, high quality corporate governance could mitigate the long-term 
underperformance observed following an SEO. Since SEOs are not uncommon events, it is possible that this 
phenomenon explains at least part of a broader relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance.  
Based on the empirical evidence and theoretical considerations outlined above, we propose: 
HII: A statistically and economically significant negative relationship will be observed between a firm’s 




3 STAGE I: EVENT STUDY 
In addressing Hypothesis I, the first stage of our analysis seeks to establish whether, in Australia, seasoned 
issuers substantially underperform a variety of return benchmarks over the long run. We begin by describing 
the SEO database utilised in our analysis, before using both buy-and-hold and calendar-time methods in 
constructing a long-term event study. 
3.1 SEO Database 
We assemble a comprehensive database of private placements, rights issues and share purchase plans (SPPs) 
made by Australian firms between January 1992 and December 2006. In a private placement, ordinary shares 
are issued by the company to a small number of selected (usually institutional) investors at an agreed price; in 
a rights issue, all existing shareholders can subscribe for additional shares, in proportion to their holdings, at a 
price fixed by the company; and in an SPP, all existing shareholders are entitled to subscribe for additional 
shares in the company up to some fixed amount of cash (currently $5,000),3 regardless of the number of shares 
they hold. Private placements are the predominant method of raising seasoned equity in the Australian market 
followed by rights issues and then SPPs, which have emerged more recently as an alternative to rights issues. 
We treat the three issue types as separate samples of SEOs. 
Data for the private placements and rights issues samples were sourced initially from the ASX’s Capital 
Raisings database, providing data on 58,518 SEOs between 1992 and 2005. This dataset was cross-checked, 
where possible, using AspectHuntley’s Capital History database and SDC Platinum. More recent data (to 
December 2006) were added from SDC Platinum, after confirmation against Appendix 3B announcements 
lodged with the ASX.4 After filtering out the many issues relating to dividend reinvestment plans, bonus 
plans, conversions, acquisitions, employee grants, options and other non-cash related share issues, the samples 
comprise 11,055 private placements (made by 1,671 firms) and 1,828 rights issues (made by 919 firms). The 
SPP data were collected by Brown, Ferguson and Stone (2008) and relate to 511 SPPs instigated by 351 firms.  
<Table 1> 
Table 1 contains summary statistics for the sample of SEOs. Issuers are predominantly smaller firms, with a 
mean (median) market capitalisation of $254m ($12.7m) across the entire database, although companies 
conducting share purchase plans are considerably larger. Companies involved in private placements tend to be 
younger than those raising equity through rights issues and SPPs and have a higher level of systematic risk 
than rights issuers, while SPP firms are less volatile. Firms conducting private placements have less gearing 
(financial leverage) than rights issuers, which is to be expected given the large proportion of resource 
companies in the sample (54%). Financial companies, typically more reliant on debt funding, make up a small 
proportion of issuers. Firms making private placements and rights issues are more likely than those conducting 
SPPs to have issued other equity within the previous year. In both absolute and relative (compared to firm 
                                                 
3 All amounts are in AUD. 
4 An Appendix 3B form must be lodged with the ASX to apply for the quotation of additional securities when the new 
issue is announced. 
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size) terms, rights issues are on average the largest, and although more money is typically raised through SPPs 
than private placements, SPPs are relatively smaller. Finally, while all issues are typically offered at a 
discount, the discounts offered to participants in rights issues are the largest, with a mean (median) of 15% 
(13%).  
3.2 Long-Run Event Study 
3.2.1 Buy-and-Hold Returns 
Three different types of benchmark are used to calculate SEO firms’ buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
(BHARs).  
The first type consists of industry and size matched control firms. Each event firm is classified according to its 
industry grouping on the event date, based on ASX industry groups for SEOs prior to 2003 and (3-digit) GICS 
industry groups from January 2003 onwards.5 The firm within that industry and with market capitalisation 
closest to that of the event firm at the end of the month prior to the event is chosen as the matched control 
firm. Where an event firm or a control firm ceases to be listed on the ASX, the pair is dropped from the 
sample from that date onwards.  
Given the small size of the Australian share market and the inherent difficulty in finding suitably matched 
firms, a portfolio benchmark based on the firm’s industry is also created. Under this second specification, each 
issuer is matched to a control portfolio consisting of all firms in the same industry group on the event date. 
Following Kothari and Warner (1997), returns on each firm in the control portfolio are first compounded over 
the entire event period and an equal-weighted average is then calculated for the portfolio. This method 
produces estimates that are less noisy than matched firm BHARs due to the fact that idiosyncratic returns are 
averaged over all stocks in the portfolio. However, averaging may still result in falsely finding abnormal 
returns where idiosyncratic price changes within an industry are large. This technique is also contaminated by 
including the event firm in the benchmark portfolio.  
Third, as in Brown, Gallery and Goei (2006), we utilise equal- and value-weighted market index benchmarks 
which are constructed from the monthly price relatives of all ASX-listed companies recorded in the SPPR 
database. Given the considerable number of small firms in our samples, the equal-weighted index is more 
representative and therefore a more appropriate benchmark than the value-weighted index. Thus, while 
abnormal returns against a value-weighted index are calculated for use later in our study, results from this 
specification are not reported in detail. Market indexes are, to a lesser degree, subject to the same advantages 
and disadvantages as industry based portfolios but more importantly, they are subject to rebalancing bias 
because of the way the indexes are constructed.  
                                                 
5 The ASX system was discontinued in 2003. Although there are differences between these two industry classification 




Monthly returns data, for event firms as well as the benchmarks, are sourced from the Centre for Research in 
Finance’s Share Price and Price Relative (SPPR) database, which provides monthly price relatives for all 
ASX-listed companies since 1973.  
Due to the relatively low power associated with event studies considering timeframes beyond three years, 
especially where small firms are involved (Ang and Zhang (2004)), we restrict the analysis to post-event 
windows of up to three years. In order to exclude announcement effects, each event window begins with (the 
return in) month +2. Thus, we consider event windows of one year [+2,+13], two years [+2,+25] and three 
years [+2,+37]. Prior to the calculation of test statistics, the impact of extreme values is mitigated by 
winsorising observations at the 2nd and 98th percentiles, as in Cowan and Sergeant (2001). Table 2 presents 
results from an analysis of mean and median BHARs for each sample, evaluated against the three alternative 
benchmarks over one, two and three year event windows. In line with Hypothesis I, the BHARs clearly 
indicate a systemic long-term underperformance anomaly for firms issuing seasoned equity in the Australian 
market.  
<Table 2> 
For the sample of private placements, a statistically significant (at 1%) level of underperformance is 
documented for issuing firms against each benchmark specification across one, two and three year event 
windows, with a magnitude in line with prior studies using similar methods (Loughran and Ritter (1995); 
Brown, Gallery and Goei (2006)). Under each specification, the level of underperformance becomes greater as 
the timeframe under examination is increased. Issuing firms are shown to underperform by a mean (median) 
of -8.9 to -17.7% (-6.1 to -30.8%) when evaluated against various benchmarks over a one year window, 
increasing to -30.4 to -50.4% (-13.5 to -88.4%) over three years. Underperformance is most severe when 
evaluated against the equal-weighted index, followed by the matched portfolio benchmark. As one would 
expect, the skewed distribution of the BHARs results in a larger level of underperformance documented using 
sign tests rather than t-tests in the majority of cases.  
Similar results emerge for rights issues, although the magnitude of underperformance is less severe than for 
private placements under all specifications. When evaluated against a matched firm benchmark, rights issuers 
do not exhibit a statistically significant level of underperformance until the third year after the issue, with a 
sign test revealing that issuers may even outperform in the first year. Over a three year window, issuers 
underperform their matched firm counterparts by a mean (median) of -14.4% (-5.1%). Against matched 
portfolio and index benchmarks, a more marked level of underperformance is revealed, with mean (median) 
underperformance of -4.5 to -7.6% (-16.2 to -19.4%) over one year and -36.2 to -42.9% (-48.7 to -75.1%) over 
three years, depending on the benchmark in question.  
Despite their values becoming increasingly negative as the event window lengthens, mean and median 
BHARs based on a matched firm benchmark do not reveal a statistically significant level of underperformance 
for SPP firms. Against portfolio and index benchmarks, however, SPPs underperform by a statistically 
significant mean (median) level of -7.2 to -13.2% (-19.8 to -22.1%) over one year, and -41.9 to -68.8% (-75.3 
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to -79.8%) over three years. The magnitude of underperformance for these latter specifications is similar to 
that documented by Brown, Ferguson and Stone (2008), and implies that SPP firms underperform by less than 
firms conducting private placements, but by more than firms conducting rights issues.6  
As a further robustness check, we re-evaluate mean and median BHARs for samples consisting of offerings 
with above and below median values for each of the firm and issue-specific factors outlined in Table 1.7 We 
find a statistically and economically significant level of underperformance under most buy-and-hold 
specifications for samples of issues/issuers comprising above and below median market capitalisation, firm 
age, beta, volatility, net gearing, relative issue size, discount and issue proceeds, for firms classified in both 
resource and non-resource sectors, and for frequent and infrequent issuers. The level of underperformance 
observed in each case is similar to that presented in Table 2. We also partition each sample into two equal 
groups according to the date of issue, and observe a similar pattern in the BHARs for each of these sets. 
However, for firms classified as banks, we observe insignificant abnormal returns in the majority of cases. We 
also calculate value-weighted BHARs for each of our samples based on firms’ market capitalisation, as in 
Brav, Geczy and Gompers (2000).8 For the private placements and rights issues samples, such an approach 
yields a similar pattern to that observed using an equal-weighting process, although the magnitude of 
underperformance is considerably reduced. For SPPs, the underperformance effect disappears under this 
specification, although it should be noted that ten issues conducted by just three companies explain over 50% 
of this result.  
3.2.2 Calendar-Time Returns 
The calendar-time technique is advocated by Fama (1998) as a method of eliminating the cross-correlation 
problem and mitigating the bad model problem inherent in the BHAR process. Equal-weighted monthly 
returns are calculated based on portfolios containing, in any one month, all firms that have issued seasoned 
equity within one, two and three year windows prior to that month.9 Using weighted least squares (WLS), the 
resulting time series of returns is then tested against the Fama and French (1993) (FF) three-factor (Equation 
1) and Carhart (1997) four-factor (Equation 2) asset pricing models, in order to determine whether abnormal 
returns have been earned by the calendar-time portfolio:10  
 ܴ௣௧ െ  ௙ܴ௧ ൌ  ߙ ൅ ܾ൫ܴ௠௧ െ ௙ܴ௧൯ ൅ ݏܵܯܤ௧ ൅ ݄ܪܯܮ௧ ൅ ߝ௧ (1)
 ܴ௣௧ െ  ௙ܴ௧ ൌ  ߙ ൅ ܾ൫ܴ௠௧ െ ௙ܴ௧൯ ൅ ݏܵܯܤ௧ ൅ ݄ܪܯܮ௧ ൅ ݉ܯܱܯ௧ ൅ ߝ௧ (2)
                                                 
6 The slight discrepancy between our results and those of Brown, Ferguson and Stone (2008) is most likely due to the 
considerable amount of returns data that has become available since their analysis was conducted, allowing us to include 
a larger number of SPPs in our calculation of BHARs. 
7 Full results from this analysis are available from the corresponding author.  A more complete analysis of the 
determinants of post-SEO BHARs is reported in Section 4.     
8 Results are available from the corresponding author on request. 
9 Firms conducting multiple issues within the event window may be included more than once.   
10 Mitchell and Stafford (2000) advocate WLS to mitigate the effect of heteroskedasticity, and involves weighting each 
observation by the number of firms in the event portfolio for that month.   
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where Rpt is the  return to the event portfolio in month t, Rft is the one-month risk-free rate observed at the 
beginning of the month, SMBt and HMLt are the monthly returns on zero investment portfolios for the size and 
book-to-market factors respectively, and MOMt represents the momentum factor. Under the assumption that 
the asset pricing model fully describes expected stock returns, the intercept term, α, is the average monthly 
abnormal return to event firms and is predicted to be zero under the null hypothesis of no abnormal 
performance. In constructing the factor portfolios for the Australian market, the procedures outlined in FF and 
Carhart (1997) are followed except (1) the book value of equity is not adjusted for tax-effect accounting, (2) 
portfolios are formed in June rather than December, and (3) future price relatives are tracked beginning four 
(rather than seven) months from the formation date.11 Market data are sourced from the SPPR database and 
accounting data from AspectHuntley. 
<Table 3> 
Results from the analysis of calendar-time returns are presented in Table 3, where underperformance is 
evaluated using a one tailed t-test of the alternative hypothesis that the average monthly abnormal return to the 
event portfolio, given by α, is negative. Confirming the results of the earlier analysis using BHARs, the 
private placements sample, when considered against the three-factor model, earns a negative and significant 
alpha of 69, 70 and 59 basis points over one, two and three year windows. This corresponds to 
underperformance of 8.63%, 18.49% and 23.69% over one, two, and three year windows respectively. When 
the momentum term is added to the asset pricing model, the level of underperformance becomes even more 
pronounced, rising to 31.17% over three years. Although underperformance pervades the entire post-event 
window, the average monthly abnormal return is shown to contract slightly in the three year sample, 
suggesting that the underperformance of issuing firms is not as severe in the third year.  
For the rights issues sample, small positive alphas are estimated for the one year portfolios, becoming 
increasingly negative thereafter, and corresponding to -3.40% and -6.66% underperformance over the three 
year window when evaluated against the three-factor and four-factor models respectively. However, these 
alpha coefficients are not statistically significant at the 5% level. Similarly, negative but insignificant alphas 
are recorded for each window when the sample of SPP firms is considered against both asset pricing models. 
The magnitude of the alphas is shown, as in the placements sample, to be decreasing with the length of the 
calendar-time window.  
To ensure the findings are robust, models are estimated using OLS rather than WLS and a value-weighted 
market index. They yield substantively the same results as those in Table 3.12 
3.2.3 Discussion 
As predicted by Hypothesis I, there is considerable evidence that firms issuing seasoned equity underperform 
a variety of benchmarks over the subsequent three year period. This result is in line with the weight of U.S. 
                                                 
11 The majority of Australian listed companies end their financial year on 30 June. 
12 Results are available from the corresponding author. 
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and other Australian evidence and is relatively robust to a variety of benchmarks and methodological 
approaches. 
While this finding is supported by results emerging from a number of variations in the buy-and-hold 
technique, it is not confirmed by the calendar-time approach in the cases of rights issues and SPPs. The 
calendar-time analysis, if anything, suggests issuing firms underperform rather than outperform the market, 
but the estimates are not uniformly statistically reliable. In supporting these conclusions, we note that 
simulation studies have found the buy-and-hold technique has more desirable statistical properties (Lyon, 
Barber and Tsai (1999)), due primarily to the low power associated with the calendar-time approach (Ang and 
Zhang (2004)). As argued by Loughran and Ritter (2000) in relation to SEO underperformance, “the usual 
implementation of the three-factor model is biased towards finding zero abnormal returns.” (p387) Fama 
(1998) acknowledges that heteroskedasticity caused by the tendency of events to cluster in calendar time may 
lead to the understatement of any anomaly under investigation.  
If issuing firms take advantage of information asymmetry to exploit windows of opportunity and issue 
overvalued equity, one might expect the level of underperformance associated with rights issues (offered to all 
shareholders) to be greater than that surrounding private placements, which tend to be offered to more 
experienced institutional investors. However, firms conducting placements exhibit larger negative abnormal 
returns than those making rights issues. This result is consistent with Brown, Gallery and Goei (2006), who 
suggest that according to a self-selection rationale, differences in the nature of the issuers that select the 
different SEO types have an overriding impact on long-run returns, whereby the size and profitability of firms 
using rights issues outweighs the effect of informational discrepancies between investor types.  
An alternative explanation is that since rights issues typically take longer to arrange than other types of issue 
and  involve a delay of up to two months between announcement and receipt of funds, rights issues are less 
attractive to the issuer who wishes to take advantage of a transitory overvaluation. SPPs also take time to 
complete (Brown, Ferguson and Stone (2008)). Private placements, on the other hand, can be arranged and 
finalised in a matter of days, providing a more appropriate tool for opportunistic managers to take advantage 
of periodic market misvaluation and raise equity funding at attractive rates. Therefore, our findings are 
consistent with the widely advocated market timing hypothesis for SEO underperformance. 
4 STAGE II: CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSIS 
In the second part we examine Hypothesis II and ask whether, by reducing the level of information asymmetry 
between managers and investors, higher quality corporate governance could help reduce the ability of 
managers to time the equity market, thereby mitigating the share price underperformance that typically 
follows an SEO. We begin by describing the data, and then fit cross-sectional regression models to evaluate 
the relationship between post-issue performance and corporate governance quality. Each model relates a 
measure of long-run post-issue performance to an indicator of corporate governance quality and controls for 
other firm-specific and issue-specific factors, as appropriate.  
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4.1 Corporate Governance Data 
Until now, the most extensive, readily available Australian dataset has been the Horwath Report, published 
annually since 2002.13 Unfortunately, the Horwath dataset imposes considerable restrictions on a study of this 
nature. Consequently, we extend and then employ a unique and more transparent corporate governance 
database that includes a much larger set of firms over a narrower time frame and a smaller set of firms over a 
wider timeframe than the Horwath Report. This process yields two additional datasets, which are employed 
alongside the Horwath Report as measures of governance quality. 
4.1.1 The Horwath Report 
The Horwath Report provides, for each year, an independent assessment of the corporate governance 
structures of Australia’s largest 250 listed companies by market capitalisation. Each report assigns an overall 
score (ranking out of 250) and a “star” rating (out of five) to firms based on their disclosures in the previous 
financial year.14 First published in 2002, the Horwath Report provides annual data from 2001 to 2007 
inclusive. Although the way in which the Horwath score is determined is not disclosed, the principal areas 
considered are reported to be the board of directors and its committees, auditor independence and policy 
disclosures of the firm under evaluation. Later reports note that a high ranking typically means the company 
has complied with most of the ASX guidelines. 
The scope and nature of the Horwath dataset restrict its utility. By selecting the largest 250 companies for 
each year under examination, the Horwath Report avoids any explicit survival bias. But the range of firms 
covered is relatively small (11% of ASX-listed firms in 2007), and each report is susceptible to a considerable 
degree of size bias. The well documented direct relationship between firm size and the quality of corporate 
governance may greatly reduce the within-sample variability in governance characteristics that would be 
evident in a broader sample. Furthermore, the effects of this restriction are magnified in a study focused on 
SEOs, which are instigated most commonly by smaller firms. Another limitation imposed by the Horwath 
Report stems from the lack of data for financial years before 2001, an important factor considering our SEO 
database begins almost ten years earlier. Finally, the scores and rankings provided in these reports emerge 
effectively from a “black box” process, limiting our ability to break down and further investigate the drivers of 
any observed relationship between governance and performance.  
In untabulated results we calculate statistics for the Horwath Report’s star ratings. They reveal that the quality 
of the corporate governance structures of the largest 250 Australian companies has increased markedly since 
2001 and especially over the period surrounding the introduction of the ASX corporate governance guidelines 
in 2003. The mean rating rises from 3.16 ‘stars’ in 2001 to 3.72 in 2006, before falling back slightly to 3.66 in 
2007. Over this period there is a corresponding decrease in the standard deviation of scores as firms became 
increasingly homogenous in their governance practices, most likely as a result of the adoption of the ASX 
guidelines. In 2007, standard deviation increased and there was a slight reduction in the average star rating, 
                                                 
13 We are indebted to Jim Psaros, of The University of Newcastle, for providing the Horwath Report data. 
14 A higher star rating implies better corporate governance.   
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perhaps as firms began to question the suitability of the prescriptive, one-size-fits-all guidelines to their 
respective business structures. The 2008 report points out that a number of industry sectors stagnated or 
moved backwards with regard to the quality of their governance structures in the 2007 financial year.  
 
 The company’s overall ranking is used for the Horwath data rather than its star rating, as the latter measure is 
just a coarser measure of the former. Within-year rankings are used rather than raw governance scores, to 
mirror the fact that BHARs inherently reflect relative performance rather than absolute returns. Furthermore, 
failure to use within year rankings may lead to any changes in the nature and magnitude of long-term post-
issue performance that have occurred over time to be spuriously attributed to the governance measure, given 
that most firms have seen considerable improvement in their governance structures over the past 15 years. We 
re-rank and reverse each year’s rankings, so that tied observations each receive an average rank over all such 
observations and a higher ranking represents better corporate governance.15 Within each year, rankings are 
then standardised by subtracting the mean ranking from each observation and dividing by the standard 
deviation for that year. 
4.1.2 The UNSW/UWA Corporate Governance Database 
In order to circumvent the restrictions imposed by the lack of comprehensive governance data for Australian 
firms, we construct, in conjunction with a team of associates at The University of New South Wales and The 
University of Western Australia, our own corporate governance database. Based on the ASX Corporate 
Governance Principles and Recommendations, 29 scoring criteria are the foundation of a composite scoring 
system.16 All data are hand-collected from the corporate governance statements, directors’ profiles, directors’ 
reports and notes to the financial statements found in 4,439 company annual reports lodged with the ASX 
between 1995 and 2007, yielding scores for 1,370 individual companies. From this process, we construct two 
individual datasets. The first, the “complete” dataset, consists of scores for 1,095 ASX-listed firms for the 
2003 and 2004 financial years. The other, the “dynamic” dataset, contains a diversified sample of between 143 
and 203 firms, and covers the 13 financial years from 1995 to 2007.  
<Table 4> 
The scoring criteria correspond to the ASX guidelines, and reflect a firm’s board and committee structure, 
auditor independence, and aspects of policy and disclosure, as set out in Table 4. Each scoring factor is coded 
as a binary variable, whereby “1” signifies the firm satisfied that criterion in that year.17 Where a firm does not 
satisfy the relevant criterion, or fails to disclose enough information to determine whether the factor was 
satisfied, a “0” is coded for that factor. To ensure consistency in data collection, a set of company-years was 
                                                 
15 For example, 1, 2, 2, 4, 5 is replaced with 5, 3.5, 3.5, 2, 1. 
16 The scoring system was devised in 2006 by three students at The University of Western Australia. See Section 4.1.2 
for further details. 
17 Although our system, where possible, adopts a substance over form approach, it should be noted that for certain aspects 
of governance it can prove difficult to differentiate between substantive adoption of ASX guidelines and a mere exercise 
in “ticking the boxes.”  
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selected and all were coded by each contributor to the database, following clearly defined protocols. The 
codings were checked against a master list and feedback was provided to the coder. As in the majority of the 
existing literature using composite corporate governance scoring systems (Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003); 
Brown and Caylor (2006)), scores are formed based on an equal-weighted aggregate of the values assigned to 
these variables, resulting in a score for each firm-year of between 0 and 29. A correlation of over 70% is 
observed between our governance rankings and rankings in the Horwath Reports, suggesting the two datasets 
share a similar focus and construction method.  
A series of subindices is also created based on the categories outlined in Table 4. Thus, in addition to the 
primary governance score, scores are calculated based on board characteristics (Board, maximum value 4), 
committee structure (Committee, maximum value 15), policy and disclosure (Policy, maximum value 8), and 
audit (Audit, maximum value 2). A variable proxying for blockholder ownership, Blockholder, is also created, 
calculated as the cumulative percentage shareholding of all shareholders holding greater than five percent of a 
company’s outstanding ordinary shares.   
The first of the two individual self-constructed datasets utilised in this study, the “complete” dataset (CGov), 
provides governance scores for 1,095 companies for the 2003 and 2004 financial years. This is equivalent to 
coverage of over 75% of all firms listed on the ASX over those years, and excludes only those firms for which 
insufficient data could be located to form a reliable score for either year. This dataset is relatively free from 
both size and survival biases. However, CGov covers a short timeframe. As with the Horwath data, the scores 
are reverse-ranked and standardised within each year before use in the regression models outlined in Section 
4.3.  
Untabulated results show a significant improvement in corporate governance quality for Australian firms 
between 2003 and 2004. Specifically, the primary governance score rises from 14.66 in 2003 to 16.39 in 
2004.18 This is not surprising considering that from March 2003 conformity with the ASX best practice 
recommendations was enforced on a “comply or explain” basis. Improvement is evident in each governance 
subindex except Board. This might suggest that the importance of a strong, independent board was well 
recognised before the guidelines were introduced. The standard deviation of the governance score increased 
slightly, possibly reflecting a situation where firms began to adopt the new principles at different speeds. 
Pairwise correlations are calculated between the various scoring metrics constructed as at 2004, as well as a 
ranked and standardised Blockholder variable. Since 15 of the 29 factors constituting the primary governance 
score are based on committee structure, it is unsurprising to see a very strong correlation (92.9%) between the 
main score and the Committee subindex. Similarly, high correlations are observed between the governance 
score and both Board (56.5%) and Policy (53.2%) subindices. Firms with favourable board characteristics and 
policy/disclosure practices are likely to have good committee structures. Smaller positive correlations are 
observed between Audit and each other subindex. Blockholder is inversely correlated with Board, implying 
                                                 
18 Between 2003 and 2004, the Board score remains unchanged at 2.16 and the Blockholder score remains unchanged at 




blockholder ownership may substitute for the monitoring role traditionally provided by active, independent 
boards.  
The second dataset we construct, the “dynamic” dataset (DGov), relates to a diversified sample ranging from 
143 to 203 firms from 1995 to 2007. Beginning with the components of the All Ordinaries index as at 
November 2007, firms are included if they are listed continuously over that period. Although this sample 
selection process introduces a survival bias and an associated size bias, it does yield a dynamic sample of 
companies from different industries with varying characteristics and greater variation by firm size than the 
Horwath data. Finally, and most importantly, it offers data spanning a timeframe almost equivalent to the SEO 
database, enabling us to explore the relationship between governance and post-issue performance for SEOs 
occurring as far back as 1995. This includes a period before corporate governance achieved the level of 
prominence it holds today, and prior to the associated increase in homogeneity in firms’ governance 
structures.  
Between 1995 and 2004, the number of firms in the sample fluctuates slightly based on data availability, 
before dropping to 143 from 2005 onwards, which reflects the impact of time constraints on the data 
collection process.19 Although the companies excluded from 2005 follow no systematic pattern (data were 
collected in alphabetical order based on company tickers) and should not therefore impose a bias once scores 
have been ranked and standardised within each year, SEOs for firms falling within financial years 2005-07 are 
excluded from our cross-sectional regression models to ensure consistency in our methodology. As with the 
other governance datasets, DGov scores are reverse-ranked and standardised within each year for use in cross-
sectional regression models.  
<Figure 1; Figure 2> 
Figure 1 reveals that sample firms had, on average, governance structures that improved consistently from 
1995 to 2007, as reflected in all governance subindices, while blockholder ownership decreased between 1995 
and 2001 before rising markedly through to 2007. As reported earlier in our analysis of the Horwath dataset, 
governance improved substantially between 2003 and 2004.  Figure 1 suggests that this trend may have begun 
in 2002, perhaps as the market reacted to the renewed push for corporate governance reform following the 
string of high profile corporate collapses in Australia and elsewhere, and even pre-empted the introduction of 
the ASX principles following the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley legislation. Trends observed in standard deviations, 
depicted in Figure 2, tell a similar story, with increasing variation in corporate governance occurring between 
firms as some reacted to changing market conditions and the recently introduced governance requirements 
before others. Further convergence is observed in later years as conformity with the ASX principles led to 
greater homogeneity in internal governance structures.  
  
                                                 
19 The construction of the database is ongoing. 
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4.1.3 Governance Scores of SEO Firms 
When the governance datasets are merged with the SEO database, ranked and standardised scores for each 
dataset and for each subindex are matched to SEOs occurring within the corresponding financial year for that 
company, taking into account that a number of Australian companies do have year-end dates in months other 
than June. The underlying rationale is that, since data found in a firm’s annual report should be based on 
conditions prevailing in that financial year, year-end data should reflect a firm’s corporate governance 
structure at the time of any SEO conducted within that timeframe.  
<Figure 3> 
Figure 3 depicts the coverage of each of the three governance datasets. 1,713 SEOs occurring between April 
2002 and December 2004 are matched to governance scores from the CGov dataset, while the DGov dataset 
provides us with scores for 1,314 issues taking place from July 1994 to December 2004. Data from the 
Horwath Report are used to describe the governance characteristics of 657 firms issuing equity between July 
2000 and December 2006.  Untabulated results show that SEO issuers typically have lower than average 
corporate governance quality as measured using each governance scoring system and each subindex therein, 
with mean (ranked and standardised) governance scores of -0.21, -0.27 and -0.54 according to the Horwath, 
CGov and DGov datasets respectively. This is unsurprising considering the fact that issuers tend to be smaller 
firms.  
<Table 5> 
Table 5 presents summary statistics for all issues and issuers matched to each governance dataset, and t-tests 
and Mann-Whitney tests to assess whether the differences in SEO and issuer characteristics across governance 
datasets are statistically significant. By construction, firms in the Horwath dataset are the largest, while the 
DGov dataset contains the oldest companies, many of which are resource firms. Although the proceeds of 
issues by Horwath firms are the largest, the relative sizes of the issues conducted by the predominantly 
smaller, less geared companies constituting the CGov database tend to be greater. Issuers from the Horwath 
dataset have the highest levels of systematic risk, despite having lower volatility than CGov or DGov firms, 
and are less likely to be repeat issuers. 
4.2 Control Variables 
When examining the relationship between post-issue performance and corporate governance quality, we 
control for factors other than governance that may also affect the long-run performance of issuing firms. They 
include the firm’s  age, size and beta. AGE is defined as the natural logarithm of the number of years from the 
firm’s listing date to the SEO issue date, based on listing dates sourced from SPPR. Spiess and Affleck-
Graves (1995) find that younger companies experience a more pronounced level of underperformance over the 
long run following an SEO. As in Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003), we take the natural logarithm of our 
firm age variable to soften the impact of extreme values. MCAP proxies for firm size, and is measured by the 
natural logarithm of the issuer’s market capitalisation (sourced from SPPR) as at the end of the month prior to 
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announcement of the issue. Loughran and Ritter (1995) note that the underperformance anomaly is more 
severe for smaller firms. BETA is used to control for a firm’s level of systematic risk, which Soucik and Allen 
(1999) suggest may favourably affect the long-run performance of issuers. BETA is calculated using a 
standard single index model over a 52 week period ending on the last trading day of the month prior to the 
announcement of the SEO, using weekly (log) holding period returns sourced from the SIRCA ASX Daily 
Database and daily returns on the ASX All Ordinaries Accumulation Index sourced from Datastream. BETA is 
winsorised at the 2% and 98% levels, in order to mitigate any undue influence of outliers.  
We also include control variables representing the discount offered to investors and the relative size of the 
offering. DISC is defined as the SEO issue price, divided by the stock’s closing price (from SPPR) at the end 
of the month before the announcement of the issue, minus one, and proxies the discount (or premium) offered 
to investors. Brown, Gallery and Goei (2006) find a significant negative relationship between the size of the 
discount offered and long-term post-issue performance. This empirical observation is in line with the 
theoretical model proposed by Heinkel and Schwartz (1986) whereby large discounts convey negative 
information regarding the true value of the issue.20 ISIZE represents the relative size of the SEO, and is 
calculated as the number of shares issued divided by the number of shares outstanding at the end of the month 
prior to the announcement of the issue (from SPPR). Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) suggest that an offer of 
larger relative size provides a stronger negative signal to the market, a notion confirmed empirically by 
Brown, Gallery and Goei (2006) in a long-term context. Both DISC and ISIZE are winsorised at the 2% and 
98% levels.  
We calculated pairwise correlations between our main governance metrics and the control variables used in 
our primary cross-sectional models, as well as a number of additional firm characteristics, for issuers 
contained in our SEO database.21 Larger firms have higher governance scores, are less volatile and more 
highly levered, and are more likely to be in the banking industry while resource firms are more frequent 
issuers and have lower governance scores.  
4.3 Cross-Sectional Model 
In order to evaluate whether a relationship exists between long-term post-issue performance and corporate 
governance quality, a series of cross-sectional models are estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS). Various 
measures of post-issue performance are regressed on a number of corporate governance metrics, controlling 
for issue-specific and firm-specific factors as outlined above. The primary models are specified in Equation 3: 
 ܤܪܣܴ௜ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܥܩ௜ ൅ ߚଶܣܩܧ௜ ൅ ߚଷܤܧܶܣ௜ ൅ ߚସܯܥܣ ௜ܲ ൅ ߚହܫܵܫܼܧ௜ ൅ ߚ଺ܦܫܵܥ௜ ൅ ߝ௜ , (3)
where β0 and εi are the constant and error terms, BHARi is a measure of buy-and-hold abnormal return (refer to 
Section 3.2.1), and CG is a corporate governance score. For each of our three samples (placements, rights and 
                                                 
20 In the context of our study, such an argument would rely on the concept of bounded rationality or the existence of 
market frictions delaying arbitrage behaviour, leading to a delayed market reaction to information conveyed by the issue.     
21 Results are available from the corresponding author. 
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SPPs), we estimate models using three different BHAR benchmarks (matched firms, industry portfolios and 
market indexes) and scoring systems from three different governance databases (DGov, CGov, and Horwath). 
Each model is estimated over one, two and three year windows, giving a total of 81 permutations. For index 
based buy-and-hold benchmarks, we use abnormal returns against an equal-weighted index for regressions 
involving the DGov and CGov datasets and a value-weighted index benchmark when evaluating the Horwath 
dataset. This distinction is created in order to reflect the composition of each sample: DGov and CGov consist 
of a broader selection of firms and the Horwath dataset is characterised by large firms. 
We originally included, as an additional firm-specific control, a dummy variable that takes the value of “1” if 
the issuer is classified as a resource/exploration firm as at the SEO issue date, where inclusion is defined as 
falling within ASX industry sub-groups one, two, three or four (prior to 2003), or GICS sector 101 or industry 
group 15104 (from 2003 onwards). This variable was included because Owen and Suchard (2008) found 
issuers within the resource industry experience greater announcement losses than industrial issuers. 
Coefficients on this variable in early models exhibited frequently changing signs and significance levels, 
implying an unstable relationship or substantial volatility in the resource sector. This would also suggest that 
the determinants of abnormal returns for resource firms in the post-issue period could be significantly 
different from those of non-resource firms, despite the fact that, as demonstrated in Section 3.2.1, resource 
firms exhibit a similar level of post-issue long-run underperformance. Therefore, we conduct analyses for 
resource firms separately, and our primary models do not consider SEOs conducted by them.  
A diagnostic analysis of the OLS regression models reveals them to be well specified, with no significant 
levels of heteroskedasticity or multicollinearity and ‘close to’ normally distributed residuals in almost all 
cases. Overall model fit is relatively weak in most permutations, with adjusted R-squared values below 0.1 
and large and highly significant constant terms in most models.22 This, however, is not surprising when we 
consider that the very existence of our left hand side variable has been the subject of considerable debate (see 
Section 2.1), and that relatively few studies have considered the empirical determinants of cross-sectional 
differences in long-run post-issue abnormal returns. Nevertheless, the F-statistics for the majority of models 
reveal the right-hand-side variables are jointly significant at the 5% level.  
<Table 6> 
Table 6 presents the results from cross-sectional models fitted to the private placements sample. As predicted 
by Hypothesis II, there is a consistently positive coefficient on the corporate governance score as measured 
using all three datasets. Furthermore, many coefficients are significant at the 5% level, suggesting that, for 
firms conducting private placements, there is a significant and positive relationship between corporate 
governance and relative post-issue performance across a number of specifications. The largest and most 
significant positive coefficients occur when measuring corporate governance quality using DGov, suggesting 
that the observed relationship may have been stronger in earlier years (1995-2000). This period represents a 
                                                 




time before corporate governance reached its current level of prominence within the Australian corporate 
environment and before the introduction of the ASX guidelines.  
The positive, significant relationship between firm age and post-issue abnormal returns observed in the 
majority of the CGov regressions is in line with expectations. However, coefficients on AGE for the DGov 
and Horwath regressions are mostly negative and insignificant, which is unsurprising considering that these 
databases primarily comprise older firms. The negative BETA coefficient appearing under most specifications 
contrasts with Soucik and Allen (1999), although it is significant in only six regressions. For the broadly based 
CGov dataset, coefficients on MCAP are mostly positive as predicted in the existing literature, but they are 
rarely statistically significant. However, for the DGov and Horwath datasets, which comprise larger 
companies, MCAP has a negative and significant impact. This implies that, while small firms experience a 
greater degree of long-term underperformance, the largest firms exhibit worse post-issue performance when 
compared with other, slightly smaller companies. This may suggest that for the largest firms, which are 
typically mature and have correspondingly relatively fewer growth opportunities, new funding requirements 
that cannot be cash funded are indicative of negative longer-term prospects. In most models, ISIZE is not 
statistically significant, although positive and intermittently significant coefficients are observed when using 
the CGov data, implying that larger issues produce stronger post-issue performance, in contrast to the findings 
of Brown, Gallery and Goei (2006). If correct, this may indicate that, for small firms making placements with 
experienced and informed institutional investors, the largest placements are subject to greater scrutiny and can 
only be implemented when firms’ prospects are strong. Finally, DISC is found to provide little explanatory 
power for post-issue abnormal returns, with few statistically significant coefficients emerging.  
<Table 7> 
Similar results appear in an analysis of firms conducting rights issues. In Table 7, positive coefficients on CG 
are observed for all but one model, although fewer variables are significant than for the placements sample. 
These results provide further, albeit weaker, support for Hypothesis II. As expected, the coefficient on BETA 
is positive and statistically significant in a number of the CGov and DGov regressions. For the Horwath 
dataset, however, a similar pattern is observed as for the placements sample. MCAP behaves similarly in our 
sample of rights issues as for private placements. ISIZE is insignificant in the CGov and DGov regressions, 
but positive and significant in a number of the Horwath regressions, as in the CGov regressions for the 
placements sample. This may suggest that sizeable rights issues conducted by the largest ASX-listed firms are 
less subject to market timing effects due to the increased informational efficiency surrounding their stock. 
DISC and AGE follow no distinct pattern, and are statistically insignificant in almost all cases. 
<Table 8> 
Results in Table 8 for the SPPs sample provide some support for Hypothesis II and no evidence to the 
contrary, although the results are weaker than for the other samples. For the CGov and DGov regressions, all 
except two of the CG coefficients are positive, few are significant at the 5% level, and no similar pattern is 
observed for the Horwath dataset. Considering SPP firms are generally much larger than firms issuing 
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seasoned equity through private placements or rights issues, the control variables behave similarly in the 
sample of SPPs as in the Horwath regressions for the other samples. AGE is insignificant in all cases, and 
BETA, as expected, is positive in the CGov regressions, but insignificant for regressions using other 
governance measures. MCAP is negative and significant in the majority of models, supporting our earlier 
observation that, in a sample of large firms, the largest issuers experience greater post-issue 
underperformance. ISIZE is positive and often significant for the Horwath regressions, as in the rights issues 
sample, and DISC again provides little explanatory power for abnormal post-issue returns. 
To provide an indication of the economic significance of the observed relationship between corporate 
governance and abnormal post-issue performance, a separate set of OLS models is estimated whereby each 
variable is standardised, resulting in standardised coefficients for the independent variables. Coefficients on 
the CG variables are found to be economically significant for all samples. Interestingly, the sizes of the CG 
coefficients are the largest for the rights issues sample, with a mean (median) value of 0.215 (0.191), implying 
that, for a one standard deviation increase in CG, the corresponding measure of long-run post-issue abnormal 
returns increases by 0.215 (0.191) standard deviations. For the SPPs and private placements samples, a one 
standard deviation increase in CG results in a mean (median) increase in post-SEO BHARs of 0.120 (0.172) 
and 0.102 (0.091) standard deviations respectively. Standardised CG coefficients are as high as 0.725, 0.350 
and 0.204 for the rights issues, SPPs and private placements samples respectively.  
<Table 9> 
Having been excluded from the primary regression models, resource firms are in the subject of a separate set 
of regressions. For brevity, Table 9 reports only the coefficients on CG for these models.23 Resource firms 
yield very different results. The coefficient on CG is negative in the majority of cases, and significant in many 
of the CGov sample regressions, which relate to smaller companies. It seems that for resource firms, 
especially smaller ones, better governance according to the ASX principles is associated with worse, not 
better, post-issue performance. The implications of this seemingly perverse outcome are important in the 
context of the prescriptive corporate governance guidelines enforced by the ASX. The ASX guidelines, and 
therefore our governance scoring system, focus on board and committee characteristics with a strong emphasis 
on the independence of directors. The evidence is that resource firms with a high proportion of independent 
directors and comprehensive committee structures actually perform worse in the post-issue period.  
Thus it seems that, as hypothesised by Boone, Field, Karpoff and Raheja (2007), a prescriptive one-size-fits-
all approach to corporate governance may in fact destroy shareholder value in some companies. For resource 
firms in particular, it is likely to be the case that, as in Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2008), the firm-specific 
knowledge of inside directors may outweigh the benefits of objectivity and independence contributed by 
outside directors. Alternatively, as suggested by Lawrence and Stapledon (1999), the benefits of additional 
compliance, including the impact of improved transparency on information asymmetry, might simply not 
outweigh the associated costs for these firms.  
                                                 
23 There are too few resource firms in the Horwath dataset to provide meaningful estimates so they are excluded. 
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To examine the robustness of the above findings, we estimate models taking account of a variety of alternative 
econometric specifications and theoretical considerations.24 All models are re-run with White’s standard 
errors, producing almost identical inferences and thereby confirming the absence of a significant level of 
heteroskedasticity. Following Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003), we also estimate the models using a robust 
estimator, where greater weightings are assigned to observations with smaller absolute residuals. Again, the 
inferences are substantively the same as those obtained using OLS, indicating the results are not driven by 
outliers.  To restrict the analysis to SEOs considered material to the issuer, the primary cross-sectional models 
are re-run, excluding issues constituting less than 5% of issued capital (2% for SPPs, which tend to be 
conducted by larger firms), revealing substantively similar results. The results are also robust to the inclusion 
of additional control variables, including blockholder ownership, share price volatility, net gearing, whether 
the issuer is classified within the banking industry and whether it makes SEOs frequently. Using monthly time 
dummies, we find our principal results pervade the entire sample period, suggesting they are not subject to 
significant time effects. By replacing the contemporaneous governance measure with lagged measures, to 
ensure that the governance structure described was in place before the issue was announced, we examine 
whether a reverse-causality scenario may explain our results. Again, the conclusions are similar to those from 
the primary models.   
4.4 Discussion 
Results from the above cross-sectional models are consistent with those found in Section 3 and are broadly in 
line with Hypothesis II.  
For the sample of private placements, which are found to exhibit the greatest degree of post-issue 
underperformance, there is considerable evidence to support the notion that good quality corporate governance 
can mitigate the poor abnormal returns experienced by issuing firms. As proposed in Section 3.2.3, the 
flexibility and speed with which private placements can be arranged and executed make them an ideal 
instrument for timing the market during transitory periods of overvaluation. It follows that, by reducing the 
level of informational asymmetry between managers and investors, corporate governance can help to prevent 
this pattern of behaviour and thereby alleviate post-issue, long-term underperformance.  
Rights issues and SPPs, which necessitate greater time to arrange, implement and finalise, are less attractive 
than private placements as market timing tools, and therefore are subject to a smaller degree of post-issue 
underperformance. Nevertheless, given control considerations associated with private placements and 
restrictions on their size and frequency imposed by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
(ASIC), placements may not be a feasible choice for many, predominantly larger companies. Thus, some 
firms may still utilise rights issues and SPPs to exploit windows of opportunity when their shares are 
overvalued. Consequently, we observe a significant, if weaker, positive relationship between governance and 
post-issue abnormal returns following these types of issue.  
                                                 





In our first stage of analysis, we conduct a long-run event study to determine whether, in an Australian 
context, firms conducting SEOs underperform a variety of benchmarks over the long term. Using a cross-
sectional regression framework, we then consider whether a relationship exists between measures of long-run 
abnormal returns and the quality of firms’ corporate governance structures. From this process, several key 
findings emerge, with important implications for researchers, corporations, investors and regulators alike. 
First, we find strong evidence that firms issuing seasoned equity are subject to a significant degree of long-run 
underperformance. Second, we identify the existence of informational asymmetry surrounding seasoned 
issuers as a channel through which governance and performance are related. Finally, we find evidence of a 
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance in the Australian market.  
While a wide body of U.S. literature has developed surrounding the long-run performance of SEO firms (see 
Loughran and Ritter (1995); Bayless and Jay (2008) among others), relatively few studies have considered this 
matter within the Australian market. Those that have done so (Soucik and Allen (1999); Brown, Gallery and 
Goei (2006); Brown, Ferguson and Stone (2008)) conclude that firms involved in seasoned issues 
underperform over the long term. Using a much larger sample than previous studies, examining SEOs 
conducted over a wider timeframe and employing more rigorous econometric procedures, we document a 
statistically and economically significant level of underperformance experienced by firms conducting private 
placements, rights issues and share purchase plans over a three year post-issue window. Consistent with the 
market timing theory for SEO underperformance, we find that private placements, which can be arranged and 
finalised quickly in order to take advantage of transitory windows of overvaluation, experience the greatest 
degree of underperformance under all specifications. With observed underperformance for seasoned issuers of 
up to 88.4% over three years, this finding has major implications for both firms’ capital financing decisions 
and investors’ evaluation of the prospects of issuing firms.25 
In our second stage of analysis, we use a set of regression models to assess whether the quality of firms’ 
corporate governance structures has any bearing on long-run abnormal share market returns following an 
SEO. Consistent with our second hypothesis, we generally observe a positive relationship between the two. 
This finding is robust to alternative estimation methods, the omission of immaterial issues, inclusion of 
additional controls, addition of monthly time dummies and the use of lagged governance variables to control 
for reverse causality. In support of the windows of opportunity hypothesis for long-term SEO 
underperformance, the association between corporate governance and post-issue performance is strongest for 
private placements. For rights issues and SPPs, instruments less suited to taking advantage of windows of 
opportunity, we observe a weaker relationship.  
                                                 




Our third main finding is that, as in the majority of the U.S. and international literature (see, for example, 
Brown and Caylor (2006); Renders and Gaeremynck (2006)), there is a relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance in Australia. Thus far, studies examining this relationship within an 
Australian context (Linden and Matolcsy (2004); Cui, Evans and Wright (2007); Henry (2008)) have been 
limited by the lack of comprehensive governance data for Australian firms, and have returned mixed and 
largely inconclusive results. We circumvent this problem by constructing a comprehensive corporate 
governance database, allowing us to explore the impact of governance across a wide range of firms and over 
an extensive timeframe. The results observed indicate that this process has proven successful in quantifying 
elements of firms’ internal governance structures that are valued by the market, while accurately representing 
the principles espoused by the ASX guidelines. 
Our results imply that post-SEO underperformance is at least in part driven by information asymmetry. By 
reducing the level of asymmetry through improving the quality of firms’ disclosures (Beekes and Brown 
(2006)), and thereby constraining managers’ market timing opportunities, good quality corporate governance 
can go some way towards mitigating the level of underperformance experienced by issuing firms. SEOs, a not 
uncommon event, are one channel through which corporate governance can drive firm performance, 
consistent with the suggestion by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003), amongst others, that agency costs 
constitute the key conduit through which good governance practices influence corporate valuation. Thus we 
have gained a deeper understanding of the dynamics of both the relationship between governance and 
performance, and the SEO underperformance anomaly itself.  
The effectiveness and suitability of prescriptive, one-size-fits-all corporate governance guidelines has been the 
subject of considerable debate (Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2008); Henry (2008)). At face value, the 
observation that an index based closely around compliance with the ASX guidelines is positively related to 
firm performance would suggest that such initiatives are beneficial to markets in which they are introduced. 
However, there is some doubt as to whether the adoption of a standardised set of guidelines is indeed 
beneficial to all firms within those markets. Small resource companies conducting SEOs apparently are better 
off with governance structures that are weaker according to the guidelines. Thus our research findings have 
implications for regulators.  
In interpreting our results, two important caveats should be kept in mind. First, while reverse causality does 
not seem to drive our results, we acknowledge the possibility that the relationship between governance and 
post-issue performance is endogenously determined, which might be captured by a third, unidentified variable 
omitted from our primary models. Second, since we examine the interaction between governance and 
performance in the context of SEOs, and observe firm performance solely within a specified post-issue 
window, we do not attempt to separate the influence of governance on post-issue abnormal returns from the 
broader governance/performance relationship evident in the returns of all firms. Consequently, the association 
we have observed might simply reflect a relationship between governance, agency costs and resource 
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Descriptive Statistics for SEOs and SEO Firms, 1992-2006 
Panel A:  Private Placements (N=11,055)         
Variable Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
Market Capitalisation ($M) 208.00 12.00** 1,780.00 0.01 98,600.00 
Firm Age (years) 13.10** 8.46** 15.76 0.00 106.68 
Beta 0.72* 0.65** 1.30 -2.50 4.26 
Volatility 0.12** 0.11** 0.08 0.00 0.89 
Net Gearing -0.02** -0.07** 0.69 -1.67 2.63 
Relative Issue Size 0.15** 0.09** 0.21 0.00 1.13 
Discount -0.02** -0.07** 0.49 -0.93 2.33 




Panel B:  Rights Issues (N=1,828)         
Variable Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
Market Capitalisation ($M) 171.00** 14.40** 874.00 0.20 27,300.00 
Firm Age (years) 15.38** 9.68** 18.56 0.01 106.51 
Beta 0.66 0.55 1.21 -2.50 4.26 
Volatility 0.12** 0.10** 0.09 0.00 0.83 
Net Gearing 0.08 -0.02 0.73 -1.67 2.63
Relative Issue Size 0.35** 0.26** 0.27 0.00 1.13 
Discount -0.15 -0.13 0.45 -0.93 2.33 




Panel C:  Share Purchase Plans (N=511)         
Variable Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
Market Capitalisation ($M) 1,580.00** 36.90** 6,800.00 0.77 54,000.00 
Firm Age (years) 17.92** 10.71* 21.32 0.41 105.30 
Beta 0.69 0.73 1.09 -2.50 4.25 
Volatility 0.09** 0.08** 0.08 0.01 0.69 
Net Gearing 0.04 -0.05 0.70 -1.67 2.63 
Relative Issue Size 0.07** 0.04** 0.09 0.00 1.13 
Discount -0.07** -0.06** 0.19 -0.93 2.33 




This table presents descriptive statistics for each of our SEO samples. Volatility is measured as the standard deviation of the issuer’s 
stock price over the 52 weeks prior to announcement of the SEO; Proceeds is calculated as the number of shares issued multiplied by 
the issue price; Net Gearing is defined as a firm’s level of short and long-term debt, less cash, divided by shareholders’ equity; 
Banking takes the value of “1” for firms classified as banks (ASX Industry 16 prior to 2003; GICS Industry Group 401 from 2003); 
Multiple takes the value of “1” where the SEO firm has issued previously within a twelve month period. Descriptions of the other 
variables are provided in Sections 4.2. Issues comprising shares allocated using more than one issuance mechanism may appear in 
more than one sample. Some variables have been winsorised, so minimum and maximum values often appear the same across different 
issue types. As private placements constitute over 80% of all issues, separate statistics for all SEOs are not presented here, but are 
available on request. This table also displays 2 tailed p-values from statistical tests of between-sample differences in the mean and 
median values of the variables. The statistical tests in Panel A are for the tests of difference between Panel A (private placements) and 
Panel B (rights issues). The statistical tests in Panel B are for the comparison of Panel B and Panel C (share purchase plans), while 
those in Panel C compare Panel C and Panel A. p-values are calculated using t-tests and Mann-Whitney tests for differences in means 







Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns for Issuing Firms 
Panel A:  Private Placements           
Benchmark/Timeframe Mean p(1tail) Median p(1tail) N 
Matched Firms (1 year) -0.089** 0.000 -0.061** 0.000 9,785 
Matched Firms (2 years) -0.184** 0.000 -0.117** 0.000 8,340 
Matched Firms (3 years) -0.304** 0.000 -0.135** 0.000 7,011 
Matched Portfolios (1 year) -0.177** 0.000 -0.289** 0.000 9,738 
Matched Portfolios (2 years) -0.348** 0.000 -0.502** 0.000 8,514
Matched Portfolios (3 years) -0.504** 0.000 -0.676** 0.000 7,379 
EW Index (1 year) -0.118** 0.000 -0.308** 0.000 10,551 
EW Index (2 years) -0.301** 0.000 -0.594** 0.000 9,294 
EW Index (3 years) -0.498** 0.000 -0.884** 0.000 8,146 
Panel B:  Rights Issues           
Benchmark/Timeframe Mean p(1tail) Median p(1tail) N
Matched Firms (1 year) 0.004 0.555 0.023* 0.950 1,618
Matched Firms (2 years) 0.012 0.612 0.013 0.616 1,402 
Matched Firms (3 years) -0.144** 0.008 -0.051* 0.029 1,172 
Matched Portfolios (1 year) -0.076** 0.000 -0.162** 0.000 1,633 
Matched Portfolios (2 years) -0.181** 0.000 -0.338** 0.000 1,476 
Matched Portfolios (3 years) -0.362** 0.000 -0.487** 0.000 1,290 
EW Index (1 year) -0.045* 0.011 -0.194** 0.000 1,746 
EW Index (2 years) -0.180** 0.000 -0.476** 0.000 1,579 
EW Index (3 years) -0.429** 0.000 -0.751** 0.000 1,389 
Panel C:  Share Purchase Plans         
Benchmark/Timeframe Mean p(1tail) Median p(1tail) N 
Matched Firms (1 year) 0.009 0.582 0.008 0.574 463 
Matched Firms (2 years) -0.085 0.159 -0.031 0.298 430 
Matched Firms (3 years) -0.144 0.150 -0.082 0.117 310 
Matched Portfolios (1 year) -0.132** 0.000 -0.221** 0.000 487 
Matched Portfolios (2 years) -0.339** 0.000 -0.516** 0.000 473 
Matched Portfolios (3 years) -0.688** 0.000 -0.753** 0.000 371 
EW Index (1 year) -0.072* 0.016 -0.198** 0.000 493 
EW Index (2 years) -0.201** 0.000 -0.528** 0.000 479 
EW Index (3 years) -0.419** 0.000 -0.798** 0.000 377 
This table displays mean and median BHARs for issuing firms. 1 tailed p-values for mean and median estimates are based on 1 tailed 
Student's t-tests and sign tests respectively. Significance at the 1% and 5% levels is denoted by ** and * respectively. Abnormal 







Calendar-Time Abnormal Returns 
Panel A: Fama-French 3-Factor Model             
Sample/Timeframe α p(1tail) Rm-Rf SMB HML   Adj-R2 Prob>F N 
Placements (1 year) -0.0069** ** 1.339** 0.122 -0.203** 0.929 0.000 159 
(0.000) 0.000 (0.000) (0.052) (0.003) 
Placements (2 years) -0.0071** ** 1.328** 0.118* -0.167** 0.943 0.000 159
(0.000) 0.000 (0.000) (0.026) (0.004) 
Placements (3 years) -0.0059** ** 1.317** 0.125* -0.142* 0.947 0.000 159 
(0.000) 0.000 (0.000) (0.015) (0.011) 
Rights (1 year) 0.0012 1.236** 0.189* -0.124 0.892 0.000 159 
(0.607) 0.696 (0.000) (0.011) (0.143) 
Rights (2 years) -0.0000 1.248** 0.111 -0.150* 0.921 0.000 159 
(0.986) 0.493 (0.000) (0.067) (0.025) 
Rights (3 years) -0.0009 1.223** 0.076 -0.133* 0.938 0.000 159 
(0.565) 0.283 (0.000) (0.139) (0.019) 
SPPs (1 year) -0.0037 0.970** 0.053 0.119 0.740 0.000 109 
(0.279) 0.140 (0.000) (0.626) (0.370) 
SPPs (2 years) -0.0024 0.925** 0.022 -0.123 0.790 0.000 121 
(0.373) 0.186 (0.000) (0.800) (0.207) 
SPPs (3 years) -0.0021 0.904** 0.034 -0.112 0.798 0.000 125
(0.400) 0.200 (0.000) (0.668) (0.197) 
Panel B: Carhart 4-Factor Model               
Sample/Timeframe α p(1tail) Rm-Rf SMB HML Mom Adj-R2 Prob>F N 
Placements (1 year) -0.0093** ** 1.338** 0.166** -0.190** 0.175** 0.941 0.000 159 
(0.000) 0.000 (0.000) (0.004) (0.002) (0.000) 
Placements (2 years) -0.0090** ** 1.338** 0.150** -0.153** 0.127** 0.953 0.000 159 
(0.000) 0.000 (0.000) (0.003) (0.005) (0.000) 
Placements (3 years) -0.0076** ** 1.327** 0.154** -0.126* 0.111** 0.952 0.000 159 
(0.000) 0.000 (0.000) (0.002) (0.019) (0.000) 
Rights (1 year) 0.0007 1.234** 0.196** -0.123 0.037 0.891 0.000 159 
(0.759) 0.621 (0.000) (0.009) (0.147) (0.345) 
Rights (2 years) -0.0011 1.250** 0.126** -0.146* 0.074* 0.923 0.000 159 
(0.592) 0.296 (0.000) (0.037) (0.027) (0.019) 
Rights (3 years) -0.0018 1.226** 0.088 -0.128* 0.061* 0.939 0.000 159 
(0.275) 0.137 (0.000) (0.085) (0.022) (0.024) 
SPPs (1 year) -0.0020 0.965** -0.019 0.092 -0.148 0.746 0.000 109 
(0.563) 0.281 (0.000) (0.866) (0.486) (0.056) 
SPPs (2 years) -0.0013 0.922** -0.018 -0.142 -0.083 0.791 0.000 121 
(0.640) 0.320 (0.000) (0.842) (0.148) (0.197) 
SPPs (3 years) -0.0010 0.905** -0.001 -0.134 -0.077 0.799 0.000 125 
(0.686) 0.343 (0.000) (0.986) (0.129) (0.197) 
This table presents WLS regression estimates based on the FF and Carhart models outlined in Equation 2. Significance at the 1% and 
5% levels is denoted by ** and * respectively. Two tailed p-values are reported in parentheses, except in the p(1tail) column where 
one-sided p-values are given. N represents the number of months over which abnormal returns are estimated. Fewer monthly 








Corporate Governance Scoring System 
Panel A:  Scoring Variables   
Variable Description Category 
1 Majority of directors are independent Board 
2 Chairman of the board is independent Board 
3 Chairman is not the CEO (CEO duality) Board 
4 Separately constituted nomination committee Committee 
5 At least three directors on the nomination committee Committee 
6 Majority of directors on the nomination committee are independent Committee 
7 Chairman of nomination committee is independent Committee 
8 Separately constituted audit committee Committee 
9 At least three directors on the audit committee Committee 
10 Majority of directors on the audit committee are independent Committee 
11 Chairman of audit committee is independent Committee 
12 Chairman of audit committee is not the chairman of the board Committee 
13 Audit committee consists of only non-executive directors Committee 
14 Audit committee charter exists Committee 
15 Separately constituted remuneration committee Committee 
16 At least three directors on the remuneration committee Committee 
17 Majority of directors on the remuneration committee are independent Committee
18 Chairman of remuneration committee is independent Committee 
19 CEO and CFO (or equivalents for both) attest that the integrity of the financial statements is 
founded on a system of risk management
Policy/Disclosure 
20 CEO and CFO (or equivalents for both) attest that the company's risk management is operating efficiently and effectively Policy/Disclosure 
21 All directors attend at least 75% of meetings, unless valid excuse is given Board 
22 Respective roles of board and management disclosed Policy/Disclosure 
23 Code of conduct exists for directors and key executives Policy/Disclosure 
24 Policy exists for trading in company securities for senior employees Policy/Disclosure 
25 Access to independent advice available at company expense Policy/Disclosure 
26 Non-executive officers do not receive options or bonus payments Policy/Disclosure 
27 Equity-based remuneration scheme exists or has been approved by shareholders Policy/Disclosure 
28 Majority of fees paid to auditors are for audit services Audit 
29 Brand name auditor (i.e. Deloitte, PWC, KPMG or Ernst & Young) Audit 
Panel B:  Director Independence Criteria   
Criterion Description   
1 Not a current executive director 
2 Did not hold a past executive position with the company within three years prior to appointment 
3 Is not a relative of a current executive director 
4 Has not served on the board for more than ten years
5 Not an officer of, or related to, a current substantial (>5%) shareholder 
6 No related party transactions 
7 No personal loans to or from the company 
8 Not a substantial (>5%) shareholder 
This table describes the variables used to construct our corporate governance scores. All references to independence in Panel A are 
based on the guidelines in Panel B. To qualify as independent, a director must satisfy all eight criteria, which are consistent with the 
definition of independence as per the ASX principles. Categories used to group these variables are based on the broader aspect of 













Descriptive Statistics for SEOs and SEO Firms Matched to Corporate Governance Datasets 
Panel A:  "Complete" Dataset (CGov), N=1,713       
Variable Mean Median Std Dev    Min Max 
Market Capitalisation ($M) 320.00** 12.70** 2,260.00 0.05 48,300.00
Firm Age (years) 14.24** 9.73 16.79 0.01 104.38 
Beta 0.67** 0.62** 1.34 -2.50 4.26 
Volatility 0.12** 0.10** 0.09 0.00 0.79 
Net Gearing -0.04** -0.06** 0.75 -1.67 2.63 
Relative Issue Size 0.16** 0.08** 0.22 0.00 1.13 
Discount -0.07 -0.09 0.44 -0.93 2.33 




Panel B:  "Dynamic" Dataset (DGov), N=1,314       
Variable Mean Median Std Dev    Min Max 
Market Capitalisation ($M) 1,390.00* 36.00** 5,600.00 0.23 54,000.00 
Firm Age (years) 23.25** 12.30** 25.90 0.03 104.38 
Beta 0.71** 0.60** 1.11 -2.50 4.26 
Volatility 0.10** 0.09** 0.08 0.00 0.77 
Net Gearing 0.07** 0.00** 0.55 -1.67 2.63 
Relative Issue Size 0.12** 0.06 0.18 0.00 1.13 
Discount -0.05 -0.07 0.43 -0.93 2.33 




Panel C: Horwath Dataset, N=657          
Variable Mean Median Std Dev    Min Max 
Market Capitalisation ($M) 2,200.00** 333.00** 7,450.00 14.30 98,600.00 
Firm Age (years) 18.58** 9.18** 24.55 0.06 105.83 
Beta 0.95 0.81 1.00 -2.50 4.26 
Volatility 0.07** 0.05** 0.06 0.01 0.61 
Net Gearing 0.26** 0.25** 0.72 -1.67 2.63 
Relative Issue Size 0.10** 0.06** 0.15 0.00 1.13 
Discount -0.06 -0.07* 0.38 -0.93 2.33 




This table presents descriptive statistics for SEOs and SEO firms matched to our governance datasets. Volatility is measured as the 
standard deviation of the issuer’s stock price over the 52 weeks prior to announcement of the SEO; Proceeds is calculated as the 
number of shares issued multiplied by the issue price; Net Gearing is defined as a firm’s level of short and long-term debt, less cash, 
divided by shareholders’ equity; Banking takes the value of “1” for firms classified as banks (ASX Industry 16 prior to 2003; GICS 
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Industry Group 401 from 2003); Multiple takes the value of “1” where the SEO firm has issued previously within a twelve month 
period. Descriptions of the other variables are provided in Sections 4.2. Some variables have been winsorised, so minimum and 
maximum values often appear the same across different datasets. Some issues have been matched to more than one governance dataset. 
This table also displays 2 tailed p-values from statistical tests of between-sample differences in the mean and median values of the 
variables. The statistical tests in Panel A are for the tests of difference between Panel A (private placements) and Panel B (rights 
issues). The statistical tests in Panel B are for the comparison of Panel B and Panel C (share purchase plans), while those in Panel C 
compare Panel C and Panel A. p-values are calculated using t-tests and Mann-Whitney tests for differences in means and medians 








Cross-Sectional OLS Regression Models - Private Placements  
Panel A:  "Complete" Dataset (CGov) 
BHARs CG AGE BETA MCAP ISIZE DISC Constant N Prob>F 
F 1yr 0.006 0.033 0.005 0.023 0.428* -0.098 -0.606 730 0.102 
(0.894) (0.338) (0.844) (0.276) (0.017) (0.191) (0.099) 
F 2yr 0.051 0.112* 0.016 0.054 0.543 -0.147 -1.542** 677 0.016 
(0.475) (0.041) (0.702) (0.108) (0.054) (0.209) (0.008) 
F 3yr 0.159 0.154 0.017 0.084 0.778 -0.065 -2.455* 614 0.048 
(0.187) (0.101) (0.822) (0.146) (0.116) (0.742) (0.013) 
P 1yr 0.035 0.006 0.001 0.005 0.267* -0.013 -0.320 804 0.143 
(0.196) (0.790) (0.932) (0.677) (0.012) (0.777) (0.160) 
P 2yr 0.080* 0.064* -0.006 0.034 0.241 -0.021 -1.109** 776 0.001 
(0.033) (0.030) (0.777) (0.058) (0.097) (0.744) (0.000) 
P 3yr 0.107 0.122** -0.061 0.012 0.173 0.021 -1.023* 753 0.013 
(0.062) (0.007) (0.078) (0.679) (0.437) (0.829) (0.034) 
I 1yr 0.051 0.015 0.011 -0.009 0.232* -0.041 -0.131 804 0.110 
(0.069) (0.497) (0.520) (0.504) (0.033) (0.394) (0.573) 
I 2yr 0.109** 0.067* -0.004 0.041* 0.284 -0.061 -1.410** 776 0.000 
(0.005) (0.028) (0.849) (0.027) (0.058) (0.352) (0.000) 
I 3yr 0.181** 0.107* -0.078* 0.027 0.254 0.013 -1.619** 753 0.000 
(0.002) (0.018)  (0.025) (0.326) (0.253) (0.892) (0.001) 
Panel B:  "Dynamic" Dataset (DGov) 
BHARs CG AGE BETA MCAP ISIZE DISC Constant N Prob>F 
F 1yr 0.074* -0.034 -0.014 -0.048** -0.060 -0.012 1.080** 387 0.042 
(0.044) (0.233) (0.649) (0.003) (0.792) (0.868) (0.001) 
F 2yr 0.163* -0.119* -0.056 -0.121** -0.173 0.088 2.840** 372 0.000 
(0.023) (0.030) (0.361) (0.000) (0.690) (0.532) (0.000) 
F 3yr 0.344** -0.134 -0.238* -0.142** 0.026 0.223 3.412** 344 0.000 
(0.002) (0.113) (0.014) (0.002) (0.969) (0.289) (0.000) 
P 1yr 0.028 0.007 -0.007 -0.026 0.036 0.062 0.492 383 0.511 
(0.408) (0.785) (0.815) (0.065) (0.860) (0.330) (0.076) 
P 2yr 0.044 -0.000 -0.087 -0.091** -0.040 0.020 1.881** 383 0.002 
(0.441) (0.994) (0.089) (0.000) (0.910) (0.851) (0.000) 
P 3yr 0.159* -0.030 -0.083 -0.176** -0.421 0.304* 3.734** 383 0.000 
(0.045) (0.611) (0.243) (0.000) (0.387) (0.042) (0.000) 
I 1yr 0.084* -0.018 -0.063* -0.041** 0.053 0.075 0.847** 423 0.006 
(0.012) (0.486) (0.031) (0.006) (0.800) (0.259) (0.003) 
I 2yr 0.140** -0.040 -0.128** -0.105** -0.117 0.011 2.254** 423 0.000 
(0.010) (0.328) (0.007) (0.000) (0.731) (0.919) (0.000) 
I 3yr 0.279** -0.082 -0.164* -0.189** -0.454 0.272 4.099** 423 0.000 
(0.000) (0.151) (0.012) (0.000) (0.337) (0.069) (0.000) 
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Table 6 (continued) 
Panel C:  Horwath Dataset  
BHARs CG AGE BETA MCAP ISIZE DISC Constant N Prob>F 
F 1yr 0.050 -0.044 -0.075 -0.085** 0.183 0.094 1.888** 314 0.015 
(0.275) (0.211) (0.079) (0.004) (0.512) (0.225) (0.001) 
F 2yr 0.102 -0.084 -0.098 -0.106* 0.730 0.179 2.302* 263 0.047 
(0.200) (0.148) (0.184) (0.031) (0.151) (0.171) (0.020) 
F 3yr 0.220 0.023 -0.117 -0.064 1.623 0.145 1.008 207 0.432 
(0.101) (0.813) (0.383) (0.421) (0.085) (0.465) (0.528) 
P 1yr 0.010 -0.019 -0.070* -0.102** 0.098 0.089 2.137** 317 0.000 
(0.783) (0.501) (0.035) (0.000) (0.656) (0.157) (0.000) 
P 2yr 0.069 0.031 -0.041 -0.147** 0.420 0.126 2.749** 282 0.001 
(0.222) (0.471) (0.436) (0.000) (0.221) (0.216) (0.000) 
P 3yr 0.170* 0.095 0.026 -0.217** 0.408 0.146 3.859** 231 0.001 
(0.037) (0.124) (0.751) (0.000) (0.425) (0.281) (0.000) 
I 1yr 0.033 -0.019 -0.114** -0.089** 0.044 0.134* 1.982** 331 0.000 
(0.348) (0.482) (0.001) (0.000) (0.842) (0.030) (0.000) 
I 2yr 0.141** -0.006 -0.080 -0.146** 0.164 0.124 3.042** 296 0.000 
(0.008) (0.881) (0.110) (0.000) (0.616) (0.183) (0.000) 
I 3yr 0.229** 0.038 -0.044 -0.183** -0.006 0.092 3.662** 244 0.018 
(0.007) (0.546) (0.602) (0.000) (0.991) (0.502) (0.000) 
This table presents results from an evaluation of the private placements sample using the model outlined in Equation 3. In the "Model" 
column, F denotes matched firm BHARs; P denotes portfolio matched BHARs and I denotes index matched BHARs, where the index 
is equal-weighted for DGov and CGov, and value-weighted for Horwath. BHAR specifications are outlined in Section 3.2.1. 
Significance at the 1% and 5% levels is denoted by ** and * respectively. 2 tailed p-values are reported in parentheses. Resource firms 







Cross-Sectional OLS Regression Models - Rights Issues 
Panel A:  "Complete" Dataset (CGov) 
BHARs CG AGE BETA MCAP ISIZE DISC Constant N Prob>F 
F 1yr 0.178 -0.005 0.203* -0.021 -0.304 -0.273 0.222 99 0.299 
(0.248) (0.957) (0.028) (0.792) (0.517) (0.492) (0.875) 
F 2yr 0.299 0.222 0.298* 0.021 0.892 -0.093 -1.445 90 0.057 
(0.148) (0.100) (0.014) (0.843) (0.171) (0.857) (0.437) 
F 3yr 0.483 0.206 0.356 0.022 1.644 0.335 -1.659 78 0.306 
(0.194) (0.399) (0.081) (0.905) (0.179) (0.774) (0.614) 
P 1yr 0.151 0.005 0.060 -0.035 0.089 -0.341 0.378 106 0.375 
(0.104) (0.929) (0.281) (0.472) (0.749) (0.164) (0.671) 
P 2yr 0.169 0.107 0.033 -0.009 0.445 -0.239 -0.517 102 0.307 
(0.132) (0.149) (0.631) (0.880) (0.201) (0.424) (0.633) 
P 3yr 0.169 0.234 0.038 0.034 0.893 0.370 -1.776 98 0.320 
(0.362) (0.056) (0.732) (0.736) (0.143) (0.557) (0.329) 
I 1yr 0.173 -0.010 0.054 -0.030 0.187 -0.342 0.220 107 0.224 
(0.057) (0.865) (0.329) (0.539) (0.496) (0.155) (0.800) 
I 2yr 0.228* 0.098 0.009 0.047 0.540 -0.214 -1.634 103 0.027 
(0.033) (0.168) (0.884) (0.414) (0.106) (0.454) (0.112) 
I 3yr 0.309 0.261* 0.002 0.112 1.110 0.399 -3.534 99 0.022 
(0.094) (0.032) (0.984) (0.266) (0.069) (0.529) (0.051) 
Panel B:  "Dynamic" Dataset (DGov) 
BHARs CG AGE BETA MCAP ISIZE DISC Constant N Prob>F 
F 1yr 0.043 0.081 0.097 0.011 0.043 0.010 -0.417 84 0.642 
(0.618) (0.152) (0.486) (0.827) (0.952) (0.966) (0.685) 
F 2yr 0.194 0.085 0.298 -0.124 -0.385 -0.225 2.280 77 0.447 
(0.183) (0.380) (0.203) (0.146) (0.753) (0.565) (0.177) 
F 3yr 0.274 -0.021 0.164 -0.073 -1.667 -0.646 1.818 71 0.645 
(0.192) (0.881) (0.621) (0.538) (0.343) (0.231) (0.443) 
P 1yr 0.018 0.018 0.233* -0.055 0.107 0.071 0.929 89 0.401 
(0.777) (0.683) (0.021) (0.165) (0.842) (0.621) (0.236) 
P 2yr 0.099 0.054 0.188 -0.113* 0.256 0.092 1.977* 89 0.246 
(0.226) (0.323) (0.138) (0.023) (0.705) (0.613) (0.045) 
P 3yr 0.044 0.011 0.239 -0.166* -0.524 -0.035 3.288* 89 0.432 
(0.701) (0.892) (0.184) (0.019) (0.586) (0.893) (0.019) 
I 1yr -0.002 0.049 0.291* -0.086 0.131 0.109 1.347 89 0.227 
(0.983) (0.336) (0.012) (0.059) (0.833) (0.514) (0.137) 
I 2yr 0.017 0.087 0.364* -0.142* 0.806 0.245 2.211 89 0.088 
(0.857) (0.179) (0.015) (0.015) (0.312) (0.251) (0.057) 
I 3yr 0.025 0.021 0.341 -0.190* -0.141 0.064 3.535* 89 0.319 
(0.843) (0.811) (0.086) (0.014) (0.894) (0.822) (0.022) 
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Table 7 (continued) 
Panel C:  Horwath Dataset  
BHARs CG AGE BETA MCAP ISIZE DISC Constant N Prob>F 
F 1yr 0.126 -0.009 0.015 -0.074 0.915 0.473 1.547 43 0.126 
(0.061) (0.875) (0.845) (0.141) (0.062) (0.346) (0.156) 
F 2yr 0.440* -0.074 0.033 -0.189 1.209 0.826 4.075 37 0.245 
(0.019) (0.614) (0.875) (0.158) (0.352) (0.539) (0.154) 
F 3yr 0.644** -0.180 0.155 -0.243 0.515 0.328 5.407 23 0.229 
(0.007) (0.273) (0.499) (0.135) (0.756) (0.835) (0.115) 
P 1yr 0.075 0.038 -0.067 -0.071* 0.636* -0.318 1.261 50 0.019 
(0.114) (0.398) (0.249) (0.045) (0.031) (0.396) (0.089) 
P 2yr 0.198* 0.073 -0.041 -0.180* 1.425* -0.624 3.127* 45 0.009 
(0.044) (0.412) (0.732) (0.011) (0.017) (0.410) (0.033) 
P 3yr 0.362** 0.102 -0.068 -0.215* 2.405* -0.466 3.476 33 0.014 
(0.010) (0.404) (0.682) (0.027) (0.030) (0.675) (0.086) 
I 1yr 0.088 0.008 -0.146* -0.044 0.353 -0.265 0.953 51 0.112 
(0.122) (0.881) (0.036) (0.300) (0.318) (0.544) (0.282) 
I 2yr 0.182 0.020 -0.145 -0.151 0.731 -0.375 3.083 46 0.122 
(0.091) (0.840) (0.263) (0.050) (0.263) (0.640) (0.055) 
I 3yr 0.375* -0.026 -0.300 -0.208 1.629 -0.623 4.319 34 0.032 
(0.016) (0.850) (0.103) (0.054) (0.186) (0.602) (0.055) 
This table presents results from an evaluation of the rights issues sample using the model outlined in Equation 3. In the "Model" 
column, F denotes matched firm BHARs; P denotes portfolio matched BHARs and I denotes index matched BHARs, where the index 
is equal-weighted for DGov and CGov, and value-weighted for Horwath. BHAR specifications are outlined in Section 3.2.1. 
Significance at the 1% and 5% levels is denoted by ** and * respectively. 2 tailed p-values are reported in parentheses. Resource firms 







Cross-Sectional OLS Regression Models - Share Purchase Plans 
Panel A:  "Complete" Dataset (CGov) 
BHARs CG AGE BETA MCAP ISIZE DISC Constant N Prob>F 
F 1yr 0.177 -0.018 0.195* -0.104 -0.043 0.267 1.860 115 0.114 
(0.138) (0.839) (0.025) (0.072) (0.972) (0.428) (0.060) 
F 2yr 0.370 0.042 0.218 -0.263* -2.812 -0.392 4.692* 105 0.242 
(0.082) (0.797) (0.164) (0.012) (0.362) (0.512) (0.010) 
F 3yr 0.463 0.133 0.221 -0.357* -2.899 -0.360 6.057* 96 0.400 
(0.132) (0.572) (0.364) (0.018) (0.527) (0.682) (0.022) 
P 1yr 0.185 0.051 0.116 -0.086 -0.004 0.261 1.256 123 0.212 
(0.056) (0.481) (0.100) (0.064) (0.997) (0.344) (0.115) 
P 2yr 0.372* 0.123 0.230* -0.210** -3.004 -0.042 3.368* 120 0.064 
(0.014) (0.272) (0.042) (0.005) (0.179) (0.924) (0.010) 
P 3yr 0.357 0.148 0.084 -0.261* -1.471 0.330 4.046* 115 0.438 
(0.125) (0.394) (0.642) (0.024) (0.668) (0.623) (0.045) 
I 1yr 0.180 0.066 0.112 -0.098* -0.283 0.177 1.414 124 0.302 
(0.072) (0.383) (0.125) (0.045) (0.788) (0.538) (0.090) 
I 2yr 0.383* 0.144 0.205 -0.211** -4.000 -0.176 3.252* 121 0.098 
(0.016) (0.228) (0.087) (0.008) (0.092) (0.704) (0.020) 
I 3yr 0.344 0.188 0.008 -0.246* -3.736 0.052 3.565 116 0.537 
(0.136) (0.281) (0.965) (0.034) (0.278) (0.938) (0.079) 
Panel B:  "Dynamic" Dataset (DGov) 
BHARs CG AGE BETA MCAP ISIZE DISC Constant N Prob>F 
F 1yr 0.315* 0.008 0.004 -0.166** -2.496 -1.391 3.342** 83 0.015 
(0.019) (0.910) (0.967) (0.001) (0.420) (0.056) (0.001) 
F 2yr 0.479* 0.051 -0.006 -0.305** 5.623 -1.281 5.977** 78 0.001 
(0.040) (0.686) (0.968) (0.000) (0.279) (0.308) (0.001) 
F 3yr 0.591 0.183 -0.108 -0.360** 4.384 -0.245 6.833** 74 0.060 
(0.088) (0.321) (0.709) (0.005) (0.575) (0.902) (0.009) 
P 1yr 0.143 -0.012 0.073 -0.102* -1.069 -1.289* 1.981* 87 0.044 
(0.261) (0.845) (0.392) (0.026) (0.706) (0.048) (0.035) 
P 2yr 0.121 0.008 -0.026 -0.219** 9.329* -0.761 4.360** 87 0.000 
(0.543) (0.932) (0.843) (0.002) (0.035) (0.456) (0.003) 
P 3yr -0.217 0.062 -0.016 -0.221* 10.098 0.442 4.351* 86 0.000 
(0.422) (0.625) (0.931) (0.021) (0.089) (0.748) (0.026) 
I 1yr 0.188 -0.039 0.052 -0.122* -1.907 -1.485* 2.470* 88 0.019 
(0.141) (0.535) (0.557) (0.010) (0.506) (0.028) (0.011) 
I 2yr 0.178 -0.049 -0.109 -0.236** 6.454 -0.657 4.926** 88 0.000 
(0.406) (0.641) (0.462) (0.003) (0.181) (0.563) (0.002) 
I 3yr -0.112 0.004 -0.013 -0.237** 3.617 0.343 4.813** 87 0.001 
(0.652) (0.977) (0.944) (0.009) (0.512) (0.793) (0.009) 
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Table 8 (continued) 
Panel C:  Horwath Dataset  
BHARs CG AGE BETA MCAP ISIZE DISC Constant N Prob>F 
F 1yr -0.053 -0.001 0.001 -0.044 2.039 -0.207 0.879 94 0.169 
(0.429) (0.990) (0.991) (0.286) (0.131) (0.745) (0.286) 
F 2yr -0.028 -0.033 -0.068 0.048 4.983* 0.012 -1.147 87 0.327 
(0.794) (0.634) (0.583) (0.459) (0.013) (0.990) (0.377) 
F 3yr 0.073 0.199 -0.349 0.178 6.157* 2.372 -4.535* 67 0.022 
(0.704) (0.090) (0.160) (0.092) (0.044) (0.134) (0.030) 
P 1yr -0.008 0.009 -0.052 -0.081* 4.120** 0.007 1.556* 97 0.000 
(0.887) (0.818) (0.468) (0.023) (0.000) (0.991) (0.028) 
P 2yr 0.034 0.019 -0.095 -0.083 5.629** -0.556 1.347 94 0.000 
(0.665) (0.728) (0.328) (0.088) (0.000) (0.460) (0.166) 
P 3yr 0.019 0.083 -0.126 -0.035 5.254* 0.886 0.045 80 0.233 
(0.878) (0.322) (0.455) (0.621) (0.024) (0.447) (0.975) 
I 1yr -0.027 0.020 -0.020 -0.071* 2.964** 0.298 1.448* 97 0.001 
(0.588) (0.558) (0.753) (0.022) (0.004) (0.541) (0.020) 
I 2yr 0.004 -0.003 -0.119 -0.017 3.773** 0.370 0.323 94 0.065 
(0.948) (0.954) (0.151) (0.677) (0.006) (0.564) (0.697) 
I 3yr -0.049 0.096 -0.133 0.064 2.731 0.544 -1.733 80 0.305 
(0.601) (0.126) (0.293) (0.234) (0.115) (0.532) (0.106) 
This table presents results from an evaluation of the SPPs sample using the model outlined in Equation 3. In the "Model" column, F 
denotes matched firm BHARs; P denotes portfolio matched BHARs and I denotes index matched BHARs, where the index is equal-
weighted for DGov and CGov, and value-weighted for Horwath. BHAR specifications are outlined in Section 3.2.1. Significance at the 






Cross-Sectional OLS Regression Models - CG Coefficients for Resource Firms 
Panel A:  Private Placements 
Dataset  F 1yr F 2yr F 3yr P 1yr P 2yr P 3yr I 1yr I 2yr I 3yr 
CGov -0.070 -0.129 -0.347 -0.120* -0.316** -0.723** -0.087 -0.205* -0.523** 
(0.446) (0.391) (0.176) (0.042) (0.001) (0.000) (0.139) (0.023) (0.000) 
DGov -0.034 0.145 0.079 -0.042 0.099 -0.032 -0.054 0.027 -0.236 
(0.645) (0.200) (0.641) (0.460) (0.199) (0.792) (0.314) (0.736) (0.058) 
Panel B:  Rights Issues 
Dataset F 1yr F 2yr F 3yr P 1yr P 2yr P 3yr I 1yr I 2yr I 3yr 
CGov -0.542 -0.585 -1.471 -0.198 -0.303 -1.049 -0.147 -0.261 -0.917 
(0.058) (0.166) (0.121) (0.287) (0.324) (0.058) (0.426) (0.348) (0.066) 
DGov -0.262 0.268 0.286 -0.243 0.057 -0.119 -0.182 0.107 -0.010 
(0.111) (0.298) (0.442) (0.056) (0.734) (0.638) (0.102) (0.499) (0.967) 
Panel C:  Share Purchase Plans 
Dataset  F 1yr F 2yr F 3yr P 1yr P 2yr P 3yr I 1yr I 2yr I 3yr 
CGov -0.587** -0.900** -1.247 -0.375* -0.479 -0.944* -0.354 -0.447 -0.915* 
(0.004) (0.008) (0.094) (0.040) (0.072) (0.026) (0.055) (0.098) (0.022) 
DGov -0.049 0.542 4.154* -0.043 0.521 0.853 -0.161 0.341 0.407 
(0.899) (0.509) (0.016) (0.916) (0.375) (0.369) (0.664) (0.521) (0.608) 
This table presents the coefficients on the CG variables when the model described by Equation 4.1 is estimated for samples of resource 
firms. Significance at the 1% and 5% levels is denoted by ** and * respectively. 2 tailed p-values are reported in parentheses. Horwath 
models are not provided due to excessively small sample sizes. F denotes matched firm BHARs; P denotes portfolio matched BHARs 





Figure 1:  Mean Governance and Subindex Scores, 1995-2007 
 
Figure 2:  Standard Deviations of Governance and Subindex Scores, 1995-2007 
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